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*322  I. INTRODUCTION
Who governs Libya? As a practical matter, the answer to that question may remain a mystery for some time. As a
legal matter, it became easier to answer on September 16, 2011, when the U.N. General Assembly approved a Libyan
delegation presented by Mustafa Mohammed ‘Abd al-Jalil, President of the National Transitional Council (NTC). It
was similarly easy to answer a year earlier when Col. Muammar Qadhafi controlled the state as he had since 1969. 1
Between February 15 and September 16, 2011, the answer was very much in dispute. Even when the United Nations
Credentials Committee 2  accepted the NTC as Libya's representative, seventeen states rejected that decision and fifteen
states abstained. 3  Seven months earlier, the NTC was virtually unknown. Even after it was formed, few understood its
organization, leadership or intent, other than to overthrow Qadhafi.
Indeed, on March 10, 2011, when France first recognized the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people,
not only had it confused its allies, it had created a precarious legal situation for itself, the NTC, Libya in general as well
as the U.N. Security Council. The purpose of this Article is to place the transition from Qadhafi-led Libya to NTC-led
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Libya within the wider theoretical and *323  historical context of an important intersection of international law and
international relations theory: how states manage civil wars so as to minimize the effect of conflict on international order.
The Libyan civil war, which commenced with relatively peaceful protests on February 15, 2011, soon deteriorated into an
armed confrontation between Libyan military forces controlled by the country's long-time ruler, Muammar Qadhafi, 4
and a combination of civilian dissidents and military defectors. 5  After only eleven days, the United Nations Security
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 condemning the measures Qadhafi deployed against the protesters and
imposing sanctions on his regime. 6  International lawyers generally agreed on the legitimacy, if not the wisdom, of the
multilateral response coordinated by the U.N. Security Council, which asserted that the principal international concern
with the Libyan civil war was international humanitarian law, primarily the protection of civilians. Through a second
resolution, the U.N. Security Council authorized states and regional organizations to enforce that mandate militarily. 7
*324  The international response appeared to be specific, well-supported, and unified behind international humanitarian
law enforced by the Security Council. Then, on March 10, 2011, France announced that it would recognize the opposition
forces based in Libya's eastern city of Benghazi as the lone legitimate representative of the Libyan people, 8  even though
the rebels did not control all of the state. International lawyers noted the legal problems that recognition raised including
treaty obligations, populations for which the opposition may or may not be responsible to say nothing of the cohesiveness
or even identity of the “new” Libyan government. 9  The Dutch prime minister called the recognition “crazy.” 10  Yet
Italy, Qatar, the United States, the United Kingdom, and others followed, recognizing the Benghazi-based opposition,
entering into contracts with the new regime including but not limited to agreements for the use of frozen *325  Libyan
assets and exploitation of petroleum resources no longer under Qadhafi's control. 11
This Article argues that, far from “crazy,” these states' decisions to recognize the opposition were largely consistent with
historical patterns in the recognition of civil war and how it will be managed by third-party states. While states might
extend equal rights to the parties to a civil war before ultimately recognizing a victorious authority, they are just as likely
to abruptly switch recognition or otherwise categorize the conflict in a way that advances their interests. 12
While some international lawyers attempted to synthesize state practice over the nineteenth and early-twentieth century
into rules that governed third-party state responses, these rules provided no normative guidance; “even those norms
which [were] clearly identifiable [were] frequently breached.” 13
Yet just because states disregarded the rules, such that they were, does not mean that they pursued their interests without
concern for the broader international order. 14  Indeed, when states recognized revolutionaries as lawful belligerents, they
often did so not only out *326  of strategic motives, such as to weaken a rival, but also out of concern with principles
that helped govern the broader society of states. 15
This Article therefore posits a second thesis: while the customary international law that developed to manage civil
wars did not, in fact, effectively regulate state behavior, it did reflect an underlying tendency for states to balance both
individual and collective interests in the creation of new states or the change of regime in existing ones.
I present this argument in two stages. First, I trace the history of belligerent recognition, the customary international
law doctrine international lawyers developed to govern states' responses foreign civil wars. While few states adhered
to the orthodox rules articulated by international lawyers, the doctrine nevertheless reflected underlying principles of
international relations that did balance national interests with collective interests in a stable international order. These
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principles--which I call “traditions” of commercialism, constitutionalism and institutionalism--guided state behavior in
ways that mitigated the pursuit of so-called realpolitik policies. 16  For example, powerful European states, including
Britain and France, viewed the possible division of the United States during the American Civil War as favorable for
their interests in the western hemisphere yet did not actively ally themselves with the Confederacy.
Second, I apply these traditions to the two-level responses states directed toward the Libyan civil war. While most
scholarly attention continues to focus on the U.N. Security Council's response, 17  and *327  especially NATO's military
engagement, 18  international lawyers and scholars have paid less attention to the parallel development that unfolded
between March and September of 2011: recognition of the Libyan opposition as the legitimate government of the Libyan
people. 19
That response was consistent with long-standing traditions of belligerent recognition. First, states recognizing the
opposition in Benghazi not only advanced their own economic and political interests, they also facilitated the securing
of Libyan energy resources as part of a global interest in the uninterrupted supply of affordable energy--the commercial
tradition. Second, the recognition of the Libyan opposition furthered a broad interest in a legitimate government in Libya
that might bring greater stability to North Africa and the Middle East--the constitutional tradition. Finally, recognition
of the Libyan opposition advanced the objectives of the U.N. Security Council resolutions which sought to uphold
principles of international humanitarian law to protect Libyan civilians--the institutionalist tradition. Recognition of the
NTC advanced a final interest, ultimately realized as a result of both state-level and U.N.-led action: removing Muammar
Qadhafi and his associates as agitators and enemies of stability and order generally but specifically with respect to Africa,
an interest which shares characteristics with all three traditions.
The argument I present is positive, not normative. Indeed, the *328  juxtaposition of international and state-level
responses produced (and is producing) friction between the multilateral focus on Libyans' humanitarian situation and
state-level interests not as morally palatable. Opposition forces, like loyalist forces, engaged in conduct that constitutes
war crimes or crimes against humanity; it will be difficult for third-party governments now dealing with the new
government to come away with clean hands. The NTC leadership remains of a somewhat opaque and anonymous
character; it is still not clear it will enjoy the popular legitimacy envisioned by U.N. Security Council Resolutions. 20
While the NTC has promised to transition authority to the new assembly for which elections were held on July 7, 2012,
it remains to be seen how its influence may or may not persist.
This Article situates the Libyan intervention in the context of the international law on belligerent recognition. This
doctrine, which originated with the need for European powers to recognize (or not) the rebelling American colonies
beginning in 1776, incorporates three foreign policy traditions for ensuring international order: (1) in the 19th century,
those priorities largely centered around preserving commercial freedom on the high seas (“commercialism”); civil wars
threatened that peace because third-party states had to decide which action to take when revolutionaries attempted
to condemn prize vessels in a neutral's ports; (2) some states simultaneously or alternatively developed a practice of
“constitutionalism” - *329  recognizing revolutionary or rebellious movements when they had established sufficient
bureaucratic infrastructure to operate as legitimate sovereign states; 21  and (3) concerts of states coordinated mediation,
management or intervention in a civil conflict based on shared interests, or “institutionalism.” What these traditions
have in common is the balancing of state-level and international-level interests. When states recognized rebelling or
revolutionary forces as legitimate belligerents, they did so to satisfy both immediate foreign policy preferences and the
overall interest in securing a stable international order. In the commercial tradition of belligerent recognition, this meant
realizing that insurgents or revolutionaries had become sufficiently engaged (or threatening) to international commerce
so as to necessitate good relations. Stability on the high seas, for example, helped all states reap the fruits of trade and
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commerce. In the constitutional tradition, states recognized belligerents not only because their success might weaken a
rival, but also because the legitimacy of a government in the eyes of its citizens had weakened or failed. A second aspect
of the constitutional tradition was that third-party states looked to the constitutional structures of the state experiencing
civil war to determine whether or not its own law indicated that a state of war existed. When Great Britain interdicted
trade with the thirteen colonies and Lincoln blockaded southern ports, third-party states justifiably asserted those states
had, through their own constitutional structures, conceded the existence of war. There emerged, in other words, a
multilateral interest in legitimate governments. In the twentieth century, institutional traditions of belligerent recognition
became more common both because international institutions, like the United Nations, became both authorized to and,
to varying degrees, capable of managing civil wars. 22  More importantly, states *330  viewed it as in their interest to
play a role in determining which new governments would be allowed to enter into the community of states, as well as
the conditions that would be attached to entry and recognition. Increasingly, humanitarian law--like the treatment of
civilians and prisoners of war--gained importance as conditions for entry.
Part II of this Article provides the historical background to the international law on belligerency. Part III fits
those historical developments within three traditions of international order: commercialism, constitutionalism and
institutionalism. Part IV applies these insights to the civil war in Libya, concluding that while third-party state recognition
of the opposition is a legal curiosity it is consistent with past state practice to both use and manage civil wars as they
affect individual and collective interests.
II. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF BELLIGERENT RECOGNITION
Writing in 1937 about the “problems raised by the Spanish civil war,” Vernon O'Rourke remarked that few “are more
interesting than those growing out of the fact that a state of war, in the legal sense, does not exist; belligerent rights
have been accorded to neither of the contestants by third Powers.” 23  In that conflict, conservative generals led by
Francisco Franco launched a military rebellion that quickly captured a significant portion of Spanish territory. Between
1936 and 1939, fascist and loyalist forces engaged in a bloody civil conflict complicated by the machinations of foreign
European powers. In the following decades, conduct of hostilities absent formal declarations of war or grant of belligerent
recognition became almost commonplace. 24  O'Rourke was just one of many international law scholars who sought
to apply the doctrine of *331  belligerent recognition to a conflict in an attempt to govern the actions of third-party
states. 25
International lawyers repeatedly attempted to use belligerent recognition to guide state behavior during violent episodes
of civil war. For example, belligerent recognition was examined as a potentially useful doctrine to manage conflicts
between France and Algeria, 26  North and South Vietnam, 27  as well as Russia and Chechnya. 28  After the Second World
War, calls for belligerent recognition to address civil wars generally waned as international institutions like the U.N.
Security Council or other concerts of states largely assumed responsibility for recognizing, mediating, or even intervening
in civil conflict using the growing body of international humanitarian law--which applied to internal conflicts--to guide
them. 29
Under the most widely accepted rendering of the doctrine, states could lawfully recognize rebelling parties under certain
conditions:
[F]irst, there must exist within the State an armed conflict of a general (as distinguished from a purely
local) character; secondly, the insurgents *332  must occupy and administer a substantial portion of
national territory; thirdly, they must conduct the hostilities in accordance with the rules of war and through
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organized armed forces acting under a responsible authority; fourthly, there must exist circumstances which
make it necessary for outside States to define their attitude by means of recognition of belligerency. 30
States rarely acknowledged these conditions--save the last--in their formal declarations to other states, nor did state
practice precisely coincide with one or more of the criteria. 31
Despite the frailty of the doctrine as a customary standard, international lawyers nevertheless attempted to apply it to
conflicts as varied in time and geography as the Spanish Civil War, American support for the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan
and the Contras in Nicaragua 32  and, more recently, NATO involvement in the wars accompanying the break-up of the
former Yugoslavia. 33  This effort largely failed. 34  States ignored the asserted conditions in favor of *333  policies that
advanced a broad range of strategic interests. 35  Yet to say that foreign policymakers ignored “the international law of
belligerency” in favor of ad hoc policies that advanced national interests does not mean that decision-makers did not
share international lawyers' concern with effectively regulating the conduct of states over the long term. States did not
extend belligerent rights only when it was convenient for them to do so, or when doing so might disadvantage a geo-
political rival, as realpolitik critiques of international law might suggest. Rather, states' decisions to recognize rebelling
or insurgent populations fit within broader perspectives on the appropriate structure of the international system.
Because the history of internal conflicts and state response to internal war has a long trajectory, this Article will focus
on four key episodes contributing to the development of the international law of belligerent recognition: the American
Revolution, the Spanish Colonial Wars of Independence, the American Civil War, and the Spanish Civil War. Other
incidents will be referred to briefly, including Greece's movement for independence from the Ottoman Empire, Cuba's
three wars for independence from Spain as well as its civil wars, national liberation wars, and finally the revolutions
and other forms of internal war after World War II. Among those investigating this area of international law, there is
considerable difficulty in arriving at what is meant by “revolution,” “internal war,” “wars of national liberation,” “civil
war,” and other variations of, what is declared in Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as “armed conflict not of
an international character.” 36 *334  For purposes of this paper, these distinctions are less important than whether the
armed conflict necessitated action by third-party states.
Indeed, international lawyers' main intent in bringing international law to bear upon internal war situations was to
regulate the actions of outside states responding to the state undergoing revolution or civil war, although there arose
the additional concern of international law in “promoting minimum standards in the conduct of hostilities; and . . . at
least some of the rules devised must apply to internal, as well as to international war.” 37  International lawyers created
gradations of internal conflict (rebellion, insurgency, belligerency) for determining when third-party states could assist
the incumbent government and delineated thresholds beyond which the laws of the conduct of war applied. 38  According
to Roscoe Oglesby, the modern laws of internal war originated with the American Revolution and the Spanish Colonial
wars for Independence. 39  These conflicts, especially the former, brought to the attention of international lawyers and
foreign governments the necessity for developing a set of guidelines to govern the behavior of third-party states in the
case of civil war. 40
*335  A. The American Revolution
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When thirteen of Great Britain's North American colonies united in rebellion against the Crown, they broke with her
commercially, on April 6, 1776, and politically, on July 4, 1776. 41  Yet even in April, 1776, when the Continental Congress
opened colonial ports to foreign commerce, Great Britain had arguably already established that open war existed between
herself and the colonies. In late 1775, the British Parliament determined that stronger measures needed to be taken
against the self-rule movement spreading among the provinces. Under Prime Minister North, Parliament adopted the
American Prohibitory Act which declared
‘all manner of (the American colonies') trade and commerce is and shall be prohibited;’ that any ships found
trading ‘shall be forfeited to his Majesty, as if the same were the ships and effects of open enemies;’ and
that ‘for the encouragement of the officers and seamen of his Majesty's ships of war’ that ‘seamen, marines,
and soldiers on board shall have the sole interest and property of all ships, vessels, goods and merchandise,
which they shall seize and take.’ 42
John Adams declared of the act, “It throws thirteen colonies out of the royal protection, levels all distinctions, and
makes us independent in spite of our supplications and entreaties . . . It may be fortunate that the act of independency
should come from the British Parliament rather than the American Congress.” 43 The new state opened ports to foreign
commerce, put in place diplomatic missions to lobby foreign governments to recognize the insurgents' independence,
issued letters of marque to authorize private ships to conduct naval warfare, and generally created the machinery for
the conduct of foreign relations. 44  These efforts to obtain aid and recognition from other *336  European powers were
largely unsuccessful for the first two years of the revolution, but the conduct of naval hostilities nevertheless forced third-
party states to make ad hoc determinations of lesser significance. 45
In 1779, John Paul Jones and privateer Pierre Landais captured three British cargo ships--The Union, The Betsy, and The
Charming Polly--and sent the vessels to Bergen, Norway, then under the sovereignty of Denmark. 46  British diplomats
in Copenhagen pressed the Danish government to return the prizes as an unlawful attack of rebels and pirates. American
demands for the return of the ships (or just compensation) relied upon two arguments. First, the ships were in a Danish
port enjoying “rights of humanity” and “hospitality.” 47  Second, Denmark had neither recognized the independence
of the colonies, nor joined with Britain in its efforts against the colonies, and was therefore bound by obligations
of neutrality. 48  Denmark responded that it had granted the British request precisely because it had not recognized
American independence and that it feared “a powerful neighbor across the North Sea”; 49  it allowed Jones, but not the
prizes, to return to sea. After this episode, Catherine II of Russia declared a policy of “armed neutrality” under which
Russia, as a neutral country, would freely trade with belligerents except for weaponry and military goods. 50  Denmark
and Sweden joined this “League of Armed Neutrality,” which enforced this policy primarily against Great Britain and
was later joined by the other European maritime powers. 51
*337  Shortly after Jones' experience at Bergen, he captured two British warships, the Serapis and HMS Countess of
Scarborough, accompanying a convoy of British cargo ships which had sailed from the Baltic Sea. 52  He brought the two
captured British vessels to Texel Roads, a port in Holland. 53  Again, Britain attempted to force the hosting government
to return the vessels, arguing that Jones was a subject of the King who “according to the laws of war and to treaties
should be placed in the class of rebels and pirates.” 54  The Dutch instead released Jones and the prizes to sea on the basis
that to do otherwise would be to “sit in judgment on the validity of their capture.” 55
Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only
TRADITIONS OF BELLIGERENT RECOGNITION: THE..., 27 Am. U. Int'l L....
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7
These episodes began building the framework for determining when and under what circumstances states were permitted
to recognize insurgents as legal belligerents. Denmark's and Holland's actions both arguably qualified as legally neutral.
The former claimed to have an existing treaty with the United Kingdom and did not recognize the new American states
as a sovereign; 56  the latter decided that giving in to British pressure would itself constitute judgment on whether or not
a “war” existed between Great Britain and her colonies. 57  The British claim was somewhat weakened by its actions
in exchanging prisoners of war, interdicting trade with the colonies, military conventions demonstrated by capitulating
British generals.” 58  Had the American Revolution not caused (or at least been followed by) revolutionary tumult in
Europe and South America, these episodes may have raised relatively isolated, obscure questions of international law
that might have just as easily gone unanswered. Yet the century that followed gave rise to multiple waves of revolutionary
activity which forced third-party states to attempt to delineate between the legitimate authority of states to manage
essentially criminal or treasonous insurgencies and the rights of legitimate belligerents who effectively established viable
counter- *338  states. 59
B. The Spanish Colonial Wars of Independence
Spain initially refused to openly endorse the American Revolution, in part because it represented a philosophical threat
to its dominion over territories in the Americas. 60  The fear was prescient. Rebellions against Spanish authority began
in “Colombia . . . in April, 1810, spread to Buenos Aires by May of the same year, to Chile and Paraguay in 1811, to
the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata by 1816, to Peru and Guatemala in 1821.” 61  As with the American Revolution, the
progress of insurgents in capturing vessels, seeking to open trading routes and managing internal affairs forced third-
party states, especially those with extensive ties in the Western Hemisphere, to adapt policies to new geopolitical realities.
In Venezuela, the Junta of Caracas opened its ports to foreign commerce, and offered tariff incentives for foreign trade
to encourage recognition. 62  Colombia followed in 1815. 63  The revolutionaries similarly established a foreign policy
apparatus to lobby European governments for aid. 64  In response, the Spanish *339  government blockaded Venezuela's
ports (although it described the blockade as the enforcement of its laws governing its possessions in the Caribbean and
South America). 65  Neutrality emerged as a common foreign policy preference for many of these states.
Britain, for example, did not prevent soldiers from fighting for rebelling forces in Venezuela in part because its law only
prevented military service “with a ‘foreign prince, state or potentate.”’ 66  Thus, Britain could not restrain its officers--
as the Spanish Crown insisted--precisely because it would not recognize the insurgents, which would flagrantly violate
its commitments to Spain. 67  On the other hand, Britain feared that adopting a posture too accommodating to the
Spanish might cause the South American insurgents to exclude British trade to the benefit of the United States. 68  In
addition, public opinion favored the revolutionaries. 69  Britain also led European efforts to mediate between Spain and
the revolutionaries on the basis of “armistice for the rebels, political equality and free trade for the colonists.” 70
For its part, the United States had long fostered ties with Caribbean and South American provinces. 71  Commercial ties
with Cuba and other Caribbean possessions, for example, predated the American Revolution; geography and agricultural
advantages made the United States better able to provide goods to Spanish colonies. 72 *340  Commercial ties with Chile
began in the late eighteenth century when “whaling and sealing [opportunities] . . . brought New England ships to the
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Chilean coast.” 73  Commerce between the United States and Latin American provinces promised to improve if Spain
lost her monopoly on trading routes between South America and trading centers at Cadiz and Barcelona. 74
The United States and the United Kingdom adopted similar, although not perfectly aligned, trajectories toward
neutrality toward the nascent Latin American states. 75  President Madison proclaimed on September 1, 1815 that neither
American personnel nor vessels would be permitted to aid the fight against Spain. 76  The declaration, technically a
statement of neutrality, effectively extended “belligerent rights to the colonies, as well as a grant of what in later parlance
became known as recognition of belligerency.” 77  The *341  division between efforts at purely commercial opportunities
for gain and active assistance to the revolutionaries became predictably difficult to delineate. Among other goods sent
via American ships to Chile early in its rebellion were pistols, rifles, and a printing press--to “be put in the service of
the revolutionists.” 78
The British position also followed a gradual course to neutrality. 79  Bound by the Treaty of Madrid to support the
Spanish in South America, the British initially attempted to prevent her subjects from providing some forms of military
aid to the revolutionaries. 80  Britain later treated the parties equally with respect to munitions exports and finally granted
the revolutionaries belligerent rights on the high seas between 1821 and 1823, when it became clear that Spain could
not reclaim her colonies. 81  Although British and American practice differed in some respects, both followed a generally
identifiable process toward recognizing Latin American revolutionaries as lawful belligerents:
[The conception of belligerency] began with the admission of rebel merchant vessels into ports; it continued
with the admission of their war vessels and prizes; gradually, it assumed the form of a grant of equal
and impartial treatment (subject, at the outset, to existing treaty obligations); the deliberate concession of
belligerent rights to both sides on the high seas was the last stage in the process of the hardening of the
conception of recognition of belligerency. 82
By extending belligerent recognition to rebelling Latin American provinces, the United States and the United Kingdom
accomplished *342  two objectives. First, it allowed their domestic merchants to participate to a greater degree in trade
with these provinces. Second, it opened up the Spanish monopoly generally to trade with all states. What appeared to be
a guiding rule of law, neutrality, provided them the ability to further these interests. This is the case for Libya's civil war.
As will be argued below, French, Italian, Qatari, British and American recognition of the Libyan opposition not only
furthered individual interests in energy exploitation, it also helped minimize the civil war's interruptions to the circulation
of affordable energy worldwide.
C. The American Civil War
While the American Revolution and the Spanish Colonial Wars for Independence oversaw the growth of certain norms
governing insurrection and rebellion, the American Civil War provided the key episode in the development of belligerent
recognition. 83  By the mid-nineteenth century, both the industrialized north and the agricultural south had developed
extensive trading networks with Europe. 84  Moreover, the increasing influence of the United States in the western
hemisphere and elsewhere compelled both European and South American states to consider whether division of the
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country might be strategically preferable. 85  Geopolitical preferences aside, *343  the conflict quickly required third-
party states to adopt policies to manage the competing demands made by Union and Confederate governments. 86
After the original seven southern governments seceded from the United States of America and attacked Fort Sumter,
South Carolina, Abraham Lincoln announced a Union blockade of ports from South Carolina to the Rio Grande; this
was subsequently amended to include ports in North Carolina and Virginia upon their secession. 87  The blockade itself
was of questionable constitutionality; his cabinet was divided on the question of whether Lincoln should dispatch the U.S.
Navy to blockade southern ports or simply close ports located in the south to commerce. 88  The former option was well-
recognized under international law to be legal only in time of war while the latter was consistent with the stated position
of the United States that the attack on Fort Sumter and secession of the southern states constituted an internal police
matter. 89  If Lincoln had only closed the ports, commercial ships attempting to dock would have violated only American
domestic law. 90  Both options engendered possible conflict with European maritime powers, particularly Britain.
Lincoln instead chose to institute blockade and called out the national militia in response to the fall of Fort Sumter. 91
Just as *344  importantly from the perspective of European powers, Jefferson Davis authorized the issuance of letters
of marque to Confederate privateers. 92  Since only a belligerent could authorize the sending of privateers to sea, Britain
had to decide whether to treat Confederate privateers as legitimate belligerents or as pirates. 93
On May 13, 1861, three days after American envoy George Dallas officially communicated the blockade to the British
government, Great Britain declared a policy of neutrality toward the divided nation and strengthened naval forces
near the United States to protect shipping interests. 94  France followed on June 10, while most European maritime
powers followed soon after. 95  Americans protested that “British recognition was hasty, that the conditions necessitating
such a step were not present, and that in fact British haste in the matter amounted to a hostile act.” 96  After the
announcement of British neutrality, legal scholars began to question when belligerency should be acknowledged. Two
competing arguments emerged: (1) that belligerent rights required an official declaration of neutrality; or (2) belligerency
may be inferred from certain acts without an official declaration. 97
While these views were never perfectly reconciled, the latter view gained substantial support from international
lawyers. 98  Under *345  international law, only belligerents could maintain effective blockades and, similarly, the
prerogative of official recognition belonged to each sovereign nation. 99  In Britain, Parliament was split over the issue
of supporting the South, even before serious contemplation of the international legal dimension was considered. 100
Liberals supported the North on the basis of hostility toward slavery (a position Lincoln was to emphasize later
in an effort to build international support), while pragmatism seemed to favor recognition of the Confederacy. 101
Despite Cabinet discussions on recognizing the Confederacy, Britain maintained a policy of neutrality after “British
Governments and Law Officers of the Crown on numerous occasions described the proclamation by the lawful
government of a blockade jure gentium against the insurgents as a recognition of a state of belligerency.” 102
The position of the U.S. government was particularly ill-timed given the building international consensus on blockades
as a subject of international law. After the Crimean War (1853-1856), Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, Turkey, and
Austria agreed in the Declaration of Paris to respect neutral commerce during war, effectively changing then customary
international norms governing privateering and blockades. 103  The United States was invited to join *346  the treaty
- the Declaration of Paris--but refused to do so until the parties included protecting private property at sea. 104  After
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the Confederacy, dependent on privateers and the hospitality of foreign ports, began issuing letters of marque, the
United States attempted to accede to the treaty in order to take advantage of its anti-privateering provisions. 105  Britain
and France refused to extend such favorable treatment to the Union, and indeed, from 1861, coordinated with other
European powers on the possibility of mediating the conflict. 106
Aside from the inferences made by British international lawyers over the use of blockades, the British also relied on
implicit recognition of belligerency resulting from the internal American constitutional machinery. First, Congress
authorized the President to declare parts of the country “in a state of insurrection.” 107  Second, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that the proclamation of a blockade was conclusive evidence that a state of war existed. 108  Earl Russell, who
wrangled with U.S. minister Adams over the timing of the British declaration, clearly expressed that the British decision
was not only based on international law, but that Judge Dunlop's decision in the case of The Tropic Wind “asserted civil
war to exist.” 109  Other neutral governments adopted a similar position. 110
*347  D. The Spanish Civil War
The Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 exposed the incoherence of the belligerency doctrine as it related to conditions of
revolution or civil war. Although by now it should be evident that the law of belligerency as articulated by Lauterpacht
enjoyed little support in the official statements of governments, a small note on the origins of the traditional doctrine
will help understand the broader picture. 111  Belligerency as a status in international law remained largely dormant--
Cuba's war for independence excepted--until its revival during the Spanish Civil War and to the subsequent explosion of
internal wars during the Cold War. The Spanish Civil War caused a robust debate among international lawyers, some of
whom somewhat abruptly suggested that the “international law of belligerency” had a long past informed by relatively
consistent state practice. 112  Indeed, it *348  is at this point that Lauterpacht acknowledged a “duty” to recognize
belligerency, even if the more concrete definition appeared later in his seminal Recognition in International Law. 113
But, Lauterpacht himself asserted the claim based only upon what he perceived to be agreement among international
lawyers at the time of a general right to recognition. 114
In any event, the Spanish Civil War broke out on July 17, 1936 led by an army in Spanish Morocco, the most effective
and well-trained garrison of the Spanish military. 115  The Spanish Civil War fit the view of belligerent recognition as
Lauterpacht asserted it to be under international law, yet no government did so until late in the conflict. 116  The facts, as
relevant to international lawyers writing at the time, were relatively clear. First, the Spanish government was legitimately
established, “in conformity with the constitution and laws . . . and as a result of free popular elections.” 117  Second,
shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, the legitimate government of Spain *349  requested assistance from France. 118
Third, one week after the outbreak of the war, Italy had provided military transport planes to transport Franco's forces
to the mainland and Hitler promised to send transports, fighters, bombers, advisers and technicians. 119  Fourth, external
powers, mostly European powers, agreed by August 21 to a policy of non-intervention signed by Britain, Belgium,
Holland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Portugal, Germany and Italy. 120  The three additional powers signed, but
with important omissions and provisos. 121
The primary debate at the time was how, given the undeniable state of belligerency between the Nationalists and the
Loyalists in Spain, governments could justify withholding belligerent recognition. The Madrid government had, in fact,
declared a blockade on August 9 and 10, historically a clear invitation for third parties to extend belligerent rights to
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both sides. 122  The American Civil War had treated the issue of belligerent recognition as one of fact; international law
could be derived from realities on the ground. This right to recognition is what Lauterpacht referred to in his treatise
on recognition, and there was apparent agreement among “probably the majority” of international lawyers at the time
that there existed a right to recognition and a corresponding duty from outside states. 123  The actions of outside powers
during the Spanish Civil War, therefore, seemed inconsistent with customary international law of belligerency.
The explanation for the discrepancy, wrote O'Rourke, was a historical shift in the nature of armed conflict:
The time may have arrived when the latter view [that a state of legal war . . . is entirely contingent upon
specific recognition by outside states], *350  based upon the applicability of the principle of sovereignty
in international relations, should give way to the practice of collective action and collective decision.
Left to individual determination, belligerency, despite its existence in fact, may be refused because of the
inconveniences thereby thrust upon the merchant vessels of the recognizing Power. This principle, carried
to its logical conclusion, might conceivably result in the refusal of foreign Powers to recognize a legal state
of war when the conflict is between two independent nations. 124
O'Rourke's premonition was correct in the sense that the latter half of the twentieth century was defined by undeclared
wars, “police” actions and intervention outside of the traditional belligerent framework.
After World War II, internal wars, revolutions and guerrilla warfare dominated the landscape of armed conflict and
produced confusion for the customary norms of international law. 125  For example, the Algerian conflict (1954-1962)
saw repeated attempts by the Algerian National Liberation Front (“FLN”) to “arrive at an understanding with the
French on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions . . . the French maintained that the FLN had no right to take
any prisoners, since it had no right to institute an armed attack against the French government in Algeria.” 126  Thus,
even the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the conclusion of the Geneva Conventions regulating the laws
of war in 1949 did not resolve the historical dilemma for international law regarding belligerents: where the incumbent
government insists that third-party states treat rebel groups as criminals within the police power of the governing state,
even though the circumstances at hand almost clearly demanded treatment as lawful belligerents. Although Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions called for adherence in cases of “armed conflict not of an international character,” the French
still balked at their invocation anticipating the possibility of recognition of *351  belligerency. 127  To be sure, in that
conflict and others the sides eventually agreed on the application of international humanitarian law, but many of the
old dilemmas unresolved by custom persisted. 128  With the increasing occurrence of civil war, “wars of liberation” and
revolution, international institutions and collective decision-making started to play a greater role.
III. TRADITIONS OF BELLIGERENT RECOGNITION
It should be clear through these episodes that the customary international law norm articulated by Lauterpacht did
not enjoy particularly strong historical support. Consider again his formulation of the requirements for belligerent
recognition:
[F]irst, there must exist within the State an armed conflict of a general (as distinguished from a purely local)
character; secondly, the insurgents must occupy and administer a substantial portion of national territory;
thirdly, they must conduct the hostilities in accordance with the rules of war and through organized armed
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forces acting under a responsible authority; fourthly, there must exist circumstances which make it necessary
for outside States to define their attitude by means of recognition of belligerency. 129
Of these criteria, only the last, “circumstances which make it necessary for third parties to define their attitude by
acknowledging the status of belligerency,” could be said to have meaningfully motivated third-party states like Denmark
and Holland during the American Revolution, or Britain and other neutrals during the American Civil War. The
existence of “widely spread armed conflict, occupation of territory and conduct of hostilities in accordance with the rules
of war” showed some significance in how neutral states defined their interests, but not how they responded. Indeed,
the announcement of a blockade, a feature of each of the episodes described above as well as several others, was not
explicitly included although it might be extrapolated from one requirement or *352  another.
For example, the ability to conduct hostilities within the established rules of war (jus in bello) did not appear to play a
significant role in determining whether or not states recognized insurgents or revolutionaries as belligerents. Certainly,
the American Revolutionaries did observe customary rules regarding the conduct of warfare as well as fighting, by
and large, under the command of a properly constituted military. 130  The Confederate States of America similarly
observed customary laws of war, although they rejected the Lieber Code--founding principles of modern international
humanitarian law--for somewhat technical reasons. 131  In any case, “conducting hostilities in accordance with the rules
of war” did not appear to influence British deliberations over policy toward the Confederacy. Certainly, when Gladstone
made his controversial speech at Newcastle supporting the independence of the Confederacy, he mentioned that the
Confederacy had an army and a navy when declaring that Jefferson Davis had “made a nation.” 132  The wider diplomatic
literature, however, shows that Britain focused primarily on balancing strategic interests in division of the United States
with the risk of war with the Union swayed in part by domestic antipathy for Southern slavery. 133
*353  The historical evidence, therefore, does not strongly support the customary international law standard asserted
by Lauterpacht and other international lawyers. This was clear from the declarations of foreign policy makers, executive
determinations of state interest, and the consensus (however limited) generated by concerts of states coordinating
responses. 134  By outlining the three traditions of belligerent recognition below, one theory for this discrepancy will
be forwarded. Namely, state practice and subsequent legal codification represented varying ideas of how to balance
individual versus collective interests in international relations. 135  Lauterpacht had essentially used the customary
international law of statehood (population, territory, government) to craft a doctrine by which to recognize when rebels
had formed a state--and therefore had a right to declare one--and a corresponding duty for third-party states to recognize
it. 136  This was a typical task of the international lawyer, to identify rules that applied to all sovereign states in the interest
of maintaining international order and limiting the occurrence and effect of war. Yet the criteria he articulated did not
actually derive from customary sources--state practice and opinio juris. The reality was that states often responded to
civil wars because their interests demanded it. 137  The interesting part of that question is how they defined their interests.
*354  This Article argues below that they often chose policy trajectories that advanced both individual state interests
and collective interests in commercial freedom, stable governments and, where possible, coordinate responses toward
civil wars with other third-party states. States deciding when they would recognize “war” in revolutionary situations
contemplated, at some level, how they perceived war in the international system generally. In the context of belligerent
recognition, these states acknowledged a place for war that was distinctly subordinate to support of legitimate
governments, the primacy of high seas commercialism, 138  and, in later years, to the broader legitimacy that institutions
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could provide. So, while Lauterpacht and other international lawyers were wrong as to the nature and normative force
behind the “duty” to recognize belligerents, the standard they articulated did reflect the tendency of states to adhere to
underlying policies that promoted better order in the international system. 139  To analogize to the prisoner's dilemma,
state decisions to recognize insurgents as legitimate sovereign participants in the international system took into account
both individual and collective gain.
A. The Commercial Tradition of Belligerent Recognition
In the commercial tradition, states recognize belligerents primarily for the protection of commercial trade on the high
seas and the attempt to minimize the effect that internal conflict has on commercial interests. Commercialism represented
a source of national wealth, but access to the seas was more importantly a key *355  free good which all nations should
enjoy. 140
Revolutionaries established openness toward commerce with foreign powers, understanding that continuity of trade
and economic exchange figured prominently in the diplomatic calculations of third-party states. 141  In the context of
belligerent recognition, Benjamin Franklin phrased the international interest in commercial freedom this way:
All the neutral States of Europe seem at present disposed to change what had before been deemed the law
of nations, to wit; that an enemy's property may be taken wherever found; and to establish a rule that free
ships shall make free goods. This rule is itself so reasonable, and of a nature to be so beneficial to mankind,
that I cannot but wish it may become general[.] 142
This principle, to minimize the effect of war on trade, enjoys support in the episodes involving John Paul Jones at
Bergen in Denmark (Norway) and Texel in Holland. Both Denmark and Holland released Jones back to the seas without
acknowledgment of the British claim that Jones was a pirate and subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the King. 143  The
two states adhered to the Grotian *356  axiom, “or first principle, the spirit of which is self-evident and immutable, to
wit: every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it.” 144
It is possible to interpret the Danish and Dutch decisions as calculated to serve a number of foreign policy interests. At the
time, the British had already established commercial and military hegemony on the high seas. An international relations
theorist 145  or an international law skeptic 146  may therefore argue that their actions were two variations on attempting
to “balance” the broader British threat. Indeed, it seems that part of the failure of British diplomacy to find any friends
in Europe regarding the American revolt was in part because of “their heavy-handed treatment of the shipping of neutral
states like Denmark and the United Provinces . . . .” 147
Yet that explanation raises more questions than it answers. If Denmark sought to weaken its “powerful neighbor across
the North Sea,” 148  then why did it return the prizes while Holland decided to release Jones and the prizes? 149  Why
did neither choose that point to ally themselves with the Americans as had France (and which, according to Wheaton,
was one possible legal action)? 150  If, on the other hand, Denmark truly feared British retaliation, why did it not then
turn Jones over? 151
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*357  The simplest explanation is that both powers viewed freedom of the seas as a policy solution that fit both national
and collective interests. Neither held Jones as a pirate because he did not pose the threat to broader interests in commercial
shipping that actual pirates did. Both powers released him with nothing “except those necessary for sailing.” 152  In other
words, when vessels arrived at port, the principle of free trade on the seas was to be respected, while the military use of the
seas was to be highly regulated. 153  Even if one adopts the realpolitik explanation for both of these states' actions as well
as the formation of the First League of Armed Neutrality, it may be read simply to mean that the broader community
of European states punished Britain for not respecting a fundamental multilateral interest: commercial freedom on the
high seas. 154
No doubt, the Americans exploited this principle during their contest with the British, but that does not mean the
principle lacked merit or force. The Americans argued to the Danish that the success of the American Revolution meant
a breaking of the English monopoly on trade, that the separation of the colonies would reduce the threat of the larger
British Empire, and that the law of nations demanded hospitality be granted to nations who had made no offense *358
to the receiving nation. 155  The United States adopted the “free ships . . . free goods” position in 1780 when deciding that
no more neutral vessels would be apprehended or English goods expropriated unless specifically marked for war-making
with the Americans. 156  Ultimately, the United States did become a principal champion of the neutral free commerce
idea after independence. 157
Commercialism played a significant role in the British and American positions toward rebelling South American
provinces during the Spanish Colonial Wars for Independence. Originally bound by treaty to “prohibit the export of
arms and war material to the rebellious Spanish colonies in America,” 158  Britain eventually reversed policy on the basis
of a “disinclination to intervene in the struggle and by the prospects of economic advantages from the growing trade
with the South American States.” 159  The original British position can be partly justified on the recent completion of
the Napoleonic Wars and distaste for revolutions. 160  British merchants, however, successfully persuaded the Foreign
Ministry that maintaining treaty commitments to Spain would undermine present and future trading opportunities. 161
Britain therefore chose to *359  accord belligerent rights to the new Latin American states not least because doing so
“was also economically advantageous to both [the U.S. and the U.K.] to have the erstwhile Spanish colonies achieve
their statehood, and thus to open up trade” but also because “an influential liberal element in both countries favored
the independence movements.” 162
For the United States, the questions surrounding belligerent recognition were not just the effect of insurgent vessels on
the high seas, 163  but to the commercial availability of American ports to both insurgent vessels and Spanish loyalist
vessels. 164  The use by the United States of neutrality and recognition not only served the purposes of advancing
commercialism, but, indeed, as Justice Story noted, the purpose of privileging “proprietary” interests during the Spanish
Colonial Wars for Independence was to minimize the disruptions to commerce. 165  As with Britain, the domestic opinion
decidedly favored the revolutionists. 166
The policy of the United States regarding Spanish vessels and those of the insurgent vessels was, as in the American
revolution, a policy of privileging availability of hospitality and trade. 167
British neutrality toward the Union and Confederacy is consistent with these previous episodes. 168  Despite divided
internal opinion on *360  which side to favor after the events of Fort Sumter, the British clung to a policy of strict
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neutrality. 169  This was consistent with an outlook that favored the maintenance of commercial trade, yet highly
regulated the ability of belligerents to wage war. Thus, the British passed regulations upon belligerent cruisers or
privateers but which “did not apply to belligerent merchant vessels, which were free to enter and leave.” 170
The most famous case contravening the general policy involved the Alabama, a Confederate cruiser built in Liverpool.
However, the record is reasonably clear that once Lord Russell discovered the nature of the ship being built (it was
supposed to be for France or Egypt), he attempted to prevent its sail. 171  In any case, Britain agreed to compensate the
United States for commercial losses of $15,500,000. 172  Other neutral states, notably France, followed the British lead
on neutrality. 173
While commercialism continued to play some part in decisions to grant belligerent status later in the nineteenth century
and up until the *361  Spanish Civil War, the international perspective on what should regulate the progress of the
international community shifted. As the nineteenth century progressed, concerns with constitutional and institutional
paradigms of international order began to complement commercialism.
B. The Constitutional Tradition of Belligerent Recognition
In the constitutional tradition of belligerent recognition, third-party states acknowledged belligerency through the
actions of the incumbent government, as well as extending greater recognition to revolutionaries that put in place
governmental or constitutional structures as their efforts met with increasing success. 174  Constitutionalism did not,
per se, require a written constitution, but rather proceeded upon the internal actions of government machinery to
determine when belligerency had occurred or whether revolutionaries had obtained legitimacy both domestically and
internationally. With regard to the former, the Act of Parliament, 16th, of King George III (the Prohibitory Act) during
the American Revolution, and the decisions issued by President Lincoln, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court during
the American Civil War demonstrated to outside states that those governments were at war with their own citizens. 175
Exemplifying the latter, President Grant refused belligerent recognition to Cuban revolutionaries in 1875, partly on the
grounds that the revolutionaries did not demonstrate the ability to properly conduct governmental affairs domestically
or internationally. 176  Similarly, Britain and France acknowledged *362  Confederate belligerency in part because all
aspects of an effective government and bureaucracy administered the secessionist state.
The notion of constitutionalism as a desirable norm for the securing of stable, legitimate regimes emerged toward the
end of the Enlightenment with Jean Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. 177  During the late-eighteenth century and
nineteenth century, the increasing appearance of liberal democracies alongside or instead of monarchical governments
steepened the importance of domestic administrative order at the international level. Attention to the internal deliberative
process in these democracies followed logically from the underlying principles of international law. 178  Even at the
beginning of the American Revolution--when the “law of nations” still fit firmly within the natural law tradition--opinio
juris, or the tendency for states to act out of a sense of legal obligation, mattered. 179
*363  For example, through the Act of Parliament interdicting trade and commerce with the American colonies during
the American Revolution, the British government signaled belligerency to third-party European states. Prior to that,
British activity against the rebelling Americans amounted to no more than a police action against those resisting
governmental authority. While that Act permitted the interdiction of trade and commerce, its significance is not
necessarily for its commercial nature, but because the incumbent government had legislated the rebels from criminals to
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actors that deserved the acknowledgment of international law. 180  The British *364  Parliament acknowledged war with
the colonies through their legislation just as Congress recognized war with the Confederacy through its authorizations
to Lincoln; neither could validly claim to third-party states that their acts applied with the force of law domestically,
but, internationally, were without legal consequence.
During the American Civil War, President Lincoln's proclamation of a blockade of southern ports, Congressional
vindication of Lincoln's wartime declarations, and a Supreme Court opinion that verified the condition of war between
the North and South provided the clearest example of constitutional machinery establishing the sufficient conditions
for belligerent recognition. As a result, Lord Russell, defending the British decision to recognize the Confederates
as legitimate belligerents, was able to marshal support from statements from every branch of the U.S. government.
Additionally, the Confederacy had formed an effective and popularly legitimized government. As a practical matter, that
government also issued letters of marque, creating a necessity for Britain and other maritime powers to respond to the
situation in the United States-- Confederate privateers must have been declared either pirates or legitimate belligerents.
Constitutionalism did not just matter because it forced states to admit when rebellion had reached an internationally
significant level; it mattered because third-party states viewed legitimate governments as more stable for the international
order. 181  Popular legitimacy (if *365  not popular sovereignty) better ensured international stability. 182  Because
“uncertainty generated in international relations forces citizens to depend emotionally and politically on their leaders,”
unpopular or illegitimate ruling authorities posed wider threats to both domestic and international order. 183  Gladstone's
speech at Newcastle (which he later admitted regretting) that the Confederacy had formed a nation went beyond mere
rhetoric. Similar to British action relative to the Greek insurrection, the importance of the formation of a legitimate
government affected British decisions “supporting popular and liberal principles abroad.” 184
The point in recognizing the concern with constitutionalism, or responsible government, is meant to show that there
existed a standard in the international community: a nascent form of self-determination that heavily influenced
belligerent recognition. 185 *366  Constitutionalism is set beside commercialism in order to show that during the
nineteenth century, there were points of convergent interests among most of the European and American countries for
acknowledging legitimate efforts at succession to the international community. 186
For example, during the Greek insurrection of 1821, Britain, then possessing a protectorate over the Ionian islands,
shifted policy when the Greeks became both militarily and constitutionally established. 187  While the specific details of
the conflict will not be explored here, it is important to note that the defining shift in policy of Great Britain followed
closely the formation of a national assembly at Epidauros that “proclaimed the independence of Greece, promulgated
a Constitution and set up the framework of a general government.” 188  While indecision marked British opinion on
international law up to the point that a Constitution was formed,
It became necessary to put aside all indecision when on March 25, 1822, the Greek provisional government
established by the terms of the Constitution promulgated at Epidauros on January 13, 1822, proclaimed
a blockade of certain Turkish ports, and the Greek victory of Kemeris at Chios on the following June 18,
gave to the insurgents the command of the seas. 189
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Indeed, the importance of internal political stability went hand in hand with commercial concerns. “Commercial
pacifists” had long argued that “representative government contributed to peace--when the citizens who bear the burdens
of war elect their *367  governments, wars become impossible--for them, the deeper cause of peace was commerce.” 190
The Spanish Civil War represented not only the unraveling of European stability prior to World War II, but also the
emergence of institutionalism as a force in belligerent recognition. The glaring inconsistencies of the Spanish Civil War
with any prior understanding of belligerent recognition are manifold. First, the elected, incumbent government of Spain,
lawfully requesting assistance from France, was confronted with a deferral to limited transfers from private arms dealers,
and then the proposal for an international conference to manage the conflict. The Spanish Civil War represented a shift in
third-party states response to civil wars--before, states determined whether they had to accord rights to revolutionaries,
but after, no belligerent rights would be accorded unless third-party states agreed to do so. 191  This clearly “limited
what [the Republican government] regarded as their legitimate right, as a properly constituted government, to buy
arms where they wished.” 192  Second, the powers seeking (or claiming) to enforce non-intervention had recognized
different governments as legitimate. Thus, Italy, Germany, Portugal, El Salvador, and Albania had accepted the Franco
regime as the legitimate government of Spain. Third, despite the declaration of blockade by the parent government,
the most recognized form of belligerent acknowledgment, third-party states steadfastly refused to declare neutrality.
Britain and France pursued their attempts at non-intervention; Russia briefly supplied the Loyalist government; and
Germany, Italy, and Portugal funneled enormous amounts of arms and aid to Franco's forces. As will be argued below,
the reliance of France and Britain on policies of non-intervention revealed the ascent (problematic in the case of Spain)
of institutionalism as the new conduit for the international community's values of what methods would ensure orderly
succession of legitimate regimes.
*368  C. The Institutionalist Tradition of Belligerent Recognition
During the development of belligerent recognition in the nineteenth century, international institutions were fleeting
and not highly influential. During the American Revolution, the First League of Armed Neutrality represented an
extraordinarily attenuated form of institutionalism--it might be safely said that the formation of the league extended
belligerent rights to the Americans, but it otherwise coordinated little action toward the American-British conflict.
Institutions eventually would become important sources of international law and the establishment of international
norms upon which customary law might be made.
In the institutionalist tradition of belligerent recognition, concerts of states or international organizations both recognize
and manage internal conflict, civil war, or revolution. Institutionalism as a method of promulgating international peace
and order is found in the writings of Kant, Locke, and Bentham, 193  but was articulated most forcefully and persuasively
by Woodrow Wilson after World War I. He saw international institutions as the method by which universal principles
governing the law of nations would be established and overseen:
Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against
selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world
such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. 194
For example, Europeans, led by the British, made overtures toward mediation between belligerents during the Spanish
Colonial Wars for Independence and the American Civil War. Institutions or concerts of states experienced limited
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success in affecting the course of the civil war in the nineteenth century although their role steadily increased after the
Spanish Civil War.
*369  During the American Civil War, when the United States attempted to accede to the Declaration of Paris, for
example, it was an institutional response--from the European maritime powers--that decided it would not be allowed
to do so. Similarly, European powers unsuccessfully attempted to mediate between the Union and the Confederacy.
Lincoln rebuffed French offers to mediate in 1862 and 1863 ultimately stating that, in its words, “Congress would be
obliged to look upon any further attempt in the same direction as an unfriendly act which it earnestly deprecates.” 195  The
importance of the European efforts to mediate lies not so much in evaluating its success or failure but in the motivations
of the powers to end “‘the innumerable calamities and immense bloodshed’ which attended the war and evils which
it inflicted upon Europe.” 196  This motivation--the desire to minimize the effect of war on civilians-- underscored the
future ascent of institutionalism as the preferred method by which third-party states recognized and managed civil wars.
Indeed, institutionalism clearly drove British and French policy toward the Spanish Civil War; not only could the conflict
be recognized through international institutions, but could be managed by them. The policy confused international
lawyers since the conditions thought necessary for extending neutral rights to the contestants existed, but third-party
states refused to acknowledge the civil war. This effectively denied shipment of arms to the Loyalists while Germany,
Italy, and Portugal acted in concert to support the rebels. British and French policy may have been driven by the initial
successes of the League of Nations from 1925-30, 197  under which it appeared that both civil and international wars could
be managed by international institutions. When war broke out in Spanish Africa in 1936, Britain and France, “shaken by
Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland, were interested in trying to achieve some kind of general stabilization in Europe
by means of . . . an international instrument *370  whereby the war in Spain should so far as possible be insulated.” 198
It has already been noted that the attempts at orchestrated non-intervention failed. Italy, Germany, and Portugal violated
the terms that were meant to regulate international management of the Spanish Civil War. What is more interesting about
the Spanish Civil War is the effect of favoring this “international instrument” over the international law of belligerent
recognition, such as it was. Skeptics of international law have often lamented its “legalistic-moralistic approach to
international problems. . . .” 199  So far as the Spanish Civil War goes, the opposite case seems more persuasive: the
abandonment of international law allowed the excesses of Mussolini, Hitler, and Salazar to precipitate Franco's success.
Belligerent recognition would have resulted in a policy of neutrality by third parties, rather than the debilitation of the
incumbent Loyalist regime.
The conduct of third-party states should not, in any case, be seen as suggesting anything normative about
institutionalism-- sometimes it works; sometimes it does not. Certainly it is more likely to work when participants agree
on the interests involved. 200  Indeed, after the Spanish Civil War, institutions have been increasingly used as mechanisms
for recognition and maintenance of civil war hostilities. 201  During the conflicts discussed where institutions played
a role in hostilities, it is evident that the institutions were lent varying levels of weight toward specific purposes. The
resolution of France and Britain not to permit the *371  Declaration of Paris to be legally available to the United States
during the American Civil War was an instance of agreed-upon interests made in the shadow of the previously discussed
tradition of commercialism. Conversely, British and French faith in the international response to the Spanish Civil War
was mistaken given that the states recognized at the time that the participants in the multilateral response did not share
sufficient interests.
After the end of World War II, the major powers established the United Nations as the chief institution for orchestrating
the international response to rebellion, insurrection, and civil war. 202  Of course, the organization's structural features,
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especially the Security Council, limited its ability to act in many of these civil conflicts during the twentieth century since
the Cold War and colonial legacies caused one of the veto-holding members to prevent collective action. 203  In the many
conflicts where the United Nations could not effectively intervene, concerts of states nevertheless played important roles
in recognizing and managing internal conflict. 204
*372  IV. LIBYA AND THE TRADITIONS OF BELLIGERENCY
Returning to the puzzle presented at the beginning of the Article, why would states like France, Italy, Qatar, the U.S.
and the United Kingdom, which all agreed to the multilateral intervention based on international humanitarian law,
simultaneously pursue a policy of unilateral recognition of the opposition in Benghazi?
Recognition of the Libyan opposition facilitated both national and multilateral interests in uninterrupted flow of energy;
created the conditions for a pluralistic Libyan republic; and, helped stabilize both Africa and the broader region by
facilitating the exit of Muammar Qadhafi. 205
A. The Factual Background
While the exact and immediate causes of the Libyan civil war are manifold-- certainly including allegations of government
ineptitude, corruption, and inspiration from protests in neighboring Egypt and Tunisia--it is well-documented that
the protests began in Benghazi on February 15, 2011. 206  The government's response, which began *373  with tear
gas, crowd dispersal, and arrests, quickly escalated to the use of live ammunition. 207  Typical of the events leading to
outbreak of civil war, the government claimed that the protesters were an “armed rebellion,” to be dealt with under
domestic criminal law. 208  On the ground, soldiers and government personnel up to high levels defected to the inchoate
opposition movement. 209  While the extent and severity of the government's crackdown was not (and still is not) clear,
foreign governments quickly asserted that the response amounted to possible crimes against humanity. 210  Incumbent
and opposition forces divided control of the country. 211  On February 26, *374  2011, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 which aimed to “impose immediate measures to stop the violence [perpetrated
by Muammar Qadafi], ensure accountability and facilitate humanitarian aid.” 212
The measures in the resolution referred the situation to the International Criminal Court; imposed an arms embargo on
Libya; leveled sanctions on key Qadhafi regime participants; ensured that “frozen assets will be made available to benefit
the people of Libya”; provided for the facilitation of humanitarian assistance; and, committed the Security Council to
review of the situation. 213
The text of the resolution was relatively clear: the principal international concerns guiding multilateral intervention in
the Libyan civil war were the perpetration of violence against civilians and the importance of bringing perpetrators of
that violence to account. While Resolution 1970 did not explicitly declare that a state of civil war existed in Libya, it
did refer to principles of international humanitarian law, generally applicable to limit the effects of armed conflict. 214
Between February 26 and March 10, 2011, protests expanded and militarized while the government's response became
more heavy-handed; both sides began committing atrocities that might be prosecuted as war crimes. 215  The conflict
created tens of *375  thousands of refugees. 216
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On March 10, 2011, France declared that it would recognize the “Libyan National Council”--a largely anonymous
group--as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. 217  The decision not only surprised many of France's allies
and joint participants in the U.N.-led efforts, but also many of its high-ranking diplomatic personnel. 218
On March 17, 2011, the Security Council revisited its February 26 mandate. Determining that the “deteriorating
situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties,” justified stronger intervention, it adopted a
“no-fly zone” over Libya to be enforced “nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements,” which were
further authorized “to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance” with the mandate. 219  While Security Council
Resolution 1973 enjoyed less support, with ten authorizing votes and five abstentions, 220  it repeated that the key
international concerns were “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan
territory.” 221  Resolution 1973 also stressed “the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds
to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and notes the decisions of the Secretary-General to send his Special *376
Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High-Level Committee
to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable
solution.” 222  The new resolution authorizing the use of force not only stepped closer to acknowledging an open civil
war-- through reference to Benghazi--but also to the importance of international management of Libya's transition to
a popularly legitimate government.
Stating that the “Libyan system has lost its legitimacy,” on March 27, 2011, Qatar recognized the “transitional council”
after concluding an agreement for Qatar Petroleum to market crude oil no longer controlled by Muammar Qadhafi. 223
Qatar's recognition was supported by the Gulf Cooperation Council members Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates. 224  On April 4, 2011, Italy recognized the “National Transition Council” as the “only
legitimate interlocutor on bilateral relations”, promising an aid package underwritten by energy company ENI and
Italian bank UniCredit. 225  On July 15, 2011, the United States recognized the National Transitional Council after
obtaining promises it would uphold Libya's international obligations, pursue a democratic reform agenda and use funds
for the benefit of Libyan people. 226  The United *377  Kingdom declared its recognition of the NTC on July 27, 2011. 227
Other states rapidly followed. 228
B. Recognition of the National Transitional Council Minimized Disruptions in Global Energy Flows
Energy security is a fundamental and global commercial priority. While free maritime passage remains an important
multilateral interest, the regime governing the ocean--based on the U.N. Charter, the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Seas and well-developed customary international law--has minimized the chance that civil wars will affect maritime
commerce in the way they did between 1776 and 1939. 229  Indeed, while ocean-going commerce remains critical,
commercial and military use of airspace has emerged as a new frontier in facilitating movement of goods and people.
Moreover, as industrialization has expanded across the globe, energy has become a key good the movement of which ties
together the commercial and economic interests of a significant majority of states. 230  Oil remains the most important
source for *378  global energy production and nearly two-thirds of that resource lies in the Middle East. 231  Civil wars
now potentially threaten these and other important multilateral interests. In the case of Libya, preserving the global
supply of uninterrupted, affordable energy was an explicit or implicit foreign policy interest of a significant number of
states, and certainly those with historical and presently high levels of energy consumption. 232  Libya holds the largest
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known oil reserves in Africa and approximately 3.34 percent of global reserves, 233  although there is a consensus that
its petroleum resources are probably much greater. 234  Moreover, its oil is relatively easily extracted and needs little
refining. 235  A substantial part of Libya's *379  extraction, transportation, and refining infrastructure is located in the
eastern half of the country that was controlled by the Libyan opposition. 236  Third-party states quickly acknowledged
the threat that the civil war posed to global energy markets. 237
Just as in the nineteenth century commercialism drove belligerent recognition out of a need to preserve maritime trade,
states recognized the opposition in Benghazi out of a need to ensure that the conduct of hostilities between the incumbent
regime and the opposition cause minimal disruptions to the participation of Libya in the global energy supply. 238
While the precise details behind France's initial recognition remain somewhat opaque, there are strong indications that
it followed some guarantee of access to French energy firms. 239  Qatari recognition on March 28, 2011 allowed the
Libyan opposition to facilitate exploitation of oil resources under their control. 240  Italian recognition on April 4 was
part of an effort to secure the flow of oil from Libya to Italy - the *380  main conduit through which Libya's oil supplied
Europe. 241  Indeed, recognition itself allowed Libyan petroleum exports to circumvent the sanctions regime imposed by
the U.N. 242  In its broader, historical context, the somewhat curious decision to recognize the Libyan opposition makes
more sense. Recognition of the opposition facilitated both individual interests of the states that did so--France, Qatar,
Italy, the U.S., the U.K. - as well as collective concerns about the movement of Libyan oil. Rebels, in turn, opened areas
under their control to foreign commerce as a way to facilitate recognition. 243
C. Recognition of the National Transitional Council (Arguably) Facilitated the Formation of a Pluralistic Libyan
Republic
When the civil war broke out, Qadhafi quickly called it an “armed rebellion” and asserted that “Islamists” had
taken small towns in the east. 244  In a lengthy televised address, Qadhafi's son Saif expanded *381  the ranks of the
rebels to include “drunkards and thugs.” 245  Official governmental representatives repeatedly asserted that the protests
constituted an internal Libyan matter, although those statements often explicitly referred to a civil war already under
way. 246  However, just as third-party states viewed the imposition of blockades in the 19th century as evidence that
a government had acknowledged a state of war (Qadhafi, in fact, tried to mine and prevent use of rebel-held ports),
Qadhafi's relatively quick use of warplanes in the east seemed determinative that a state of war existed. 247
*382  More importantly, the rebelling populations and defectors from the government appeared to start forming
governance structures to run the eastern towns and provinces. 248  On March 5, 2011, former Qadhafi regime Justice
Minister Mustafa ‘Abd al-Jalil announced that the “national council - the opposition's newly formed government -
held its first formal meeting in the eastern rebel stronghold of Benghazi and declared itself the sole representative” of
Libya. 249  Former Interior Minister Abdel Fatah Younes coordinated the military organization of loosely affiliated
civilians and professional soldiers that defected from the Libyan Army until he was assassinated. The National
Transitional Council formed a diplomatic corps comprised in significant part by diplomats who defected from the Libyan
regime. 250
Beginning with France's recognition on March 10, 2011, the National Transitional Council earned the recognition of
the key military and strategic players affecting the Libyan intervention and eventually the U.N. General Assembly.
While it has for some time *383  been doubtful that the National Transitional Council is as well-organized, unified or
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representative as it suggests, third-party states accepted that it enjoyed greater legitimacy, and therefore greater promise
for stability. 251  Indeed, by all accounts the national elections for an interim legislative assembly held on July 7, 2012
were legitimate by international standards and the NTC has promised, as of August, 2012, to transition authority to it
to oversee the drafting of a new constitution. 252
D. Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council was Consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970
and 1973
In the institutionalist tradition of belligerent recognition, third party states coordinate the recognition, mediation and
management of a civil war. International condemnation of Qadhafi's response to the protests in Benghazi began as early
as February 21, 2011 and the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted its first sanctions resolution on February 26,
2011. In addition to the actions *384  coordinated by the Security Council, the African Union repeatedly attempted to
broker cease-fires and longer-term solutions to the conflict. 253
The rapidness of the international response was directly related to the level of consensus among third-party states on
two primary interests: the protection of civilians under international humanitarian law and the interest in removing
the Qadhafi regime which continuously and repeatedly undermined international order generally and African order
specifically. As explored above, the institutional tradition for managing civil wars is appealing because concerts of states
or international institutions are able to agree upon interests at stake in a civil war and then apply a collective response;
national interests and collective interests theoretically dovetail. Indeed, this is one reason why international humanitarian
law has become such a motivating force for collective action during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries - third-party
states have reached agreement that all states, and all people, benefit from separating, and protecting, non-combatants
from combatants in warfare, even for “internal” armed conflict. 254  As James Turner Johnson noted:
The shift from ‘law of war’ to ‘law of armed conflicts' is more than simply one of nomenclature;
substantively, it signifies the effort of the international community to extend to all armed conflicts, whether
domestic or between states, whether formally declared wars or not, the same rules for conduct earlier
imposed on states formally at war with each other. Other important elements in the new conception include
broader responsibility for the international community to enforce the rules for right conduct in armed
conflict and a shift toward understanding violations of these rules as crimes of war for which individuals
may be prosecuted. 255
*385  This consensus is not only reflected in multilateral treaties like the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, but also in the reformation of military codes, the training of military personnel
and the means by which governments may ensure domestic order. 256  Qadhafi's use of helicopters and warplanes on the
initial protests far exceeded the outer limits of those means and led to the effective declaration that a civil war existed
by the U.N. Security Council which acted to enforce international humanitarian law. If the protests were, as Qadhafi
claimed, merely civil unrest, then use of warplanes on civilians was “outrageous”; if, on the other hand, Qadhafi used
the warplanes - as he claimed - only on opposition arms depots, then he could hardly deny the existence of an armed
conflict and therefore the applicability of international humanitarian law.
Certainly, recognitions by third-party states were consistent with the U.N. Security Council Resolutions calling for states
“acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-
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General, to take all necessary measures” to achieve resolution objectives. Yet these states were likely motivated by
another interest: removal of Qadhafi from power altogether. Indeed, the U.N. Security Council Resolutions specifically
sanctioned Qadhafi, members of his family and associates for their participation in unlawfully targeting civilians. If it is
true, as this article has argued, that third-party states respond to civil wars in ways that advance both national interests
and international order, then unilateral recognitions made sense because they delegitimized the Qadhafi regime.
The national interests in doing so were not difficult to identify: Qadhafi and his agents were tied to multiple small-
scale attacks on civilians including the 1986 bombing of a German nightclub frequented by U.S. soldiers, the 1988
bombing of a Pan Am passenger plane that killed nationals of 21 states and the hijacking of a passenger plane in Karachi,
Pakistan. On a larger scale, Qadhafi's regime regularly provoked conflicts with its neighbors including *386  Egypt
and Sudan, invaded neighboring Chad four times (conducting, in essence, a proxy war with France), “trained, armed
and dispatched . . . Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh to take power in West African countries,” actively participated
in the blood diamond trade and, until 2003, built up a clandestine nuclear weapons program in violation of its treaty
obligations. 257  While it remains unclear whether the succeeding governing persons and structures will cause fewer
problems, states that extended unilateral recognition to the forces in Benghazi had sufficient reason to believe that their
success would benefit both African and international stability.
V. CONCLUSION
States which extended unilateral and total recognition to the opposition forces in Benghazi demonstrated, again, that
international lawyers could probably never have formed practical or coherent rules to govern the conduct of foreign
states toward internal wars. 258  In the case of civil wars, third-party states' response could not be said to be *387
driven explicitly by revolutionaries' “occupation of territory” or their proper conduct of warfare. At the end of the day,
recognition is well-recognized under international law to be the prerogative of the granting state, and it has long been
used in curious ways. 259
Yet, that does not mean that the customary international norms they articulated did not reflect underlying principles of
decision-making that sought to balance national with international interests. 260  During the episodes described above,
third-party states showed a distinct commitment to minimize the effect of a civil war on international commerce and
trade; scrutinized the legitimacy and sustainability of revolutionary governments; and, attempted, where possible, to
reach agreement with similarly affected states to determine the appropriate course of action.
*388  French, Italian, Qatari, American and British recognition of the NTC in the early and middle stages of the conflict
can be reasonably interpreted to have minimized the effect of the civil war on global energy interests, 261  acknowledged,
however preliminarily, the existence of a counter-government there; and, advanced the U.N. Security Council's interest
in protecting civilians. The swiftness and strength of action within the United Nations system, the Arab League as well as
other international organizations is attributable to Qadhafi's practice of destabilizing large parts of the world, especially
Africa. This may also explain why states were interested in recognizing the National Transitional Council: to facilitate
his permanent ouster from political and military influence.
As it happens, Qadhafi's demise did not precipitate an immediate restoration of order in Libya nor does the National
Transitional Council appear to have forged the national, popular legitimacy envisioned by Security Council Resolutions
1970 and 1973. Militarily, Libya is now divided into a “bewildering array of grassroots military formations.” 262
Former Qadhafi regime participants in the National Transitional Council have weakened its legitimacy in the eyes of
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many Libyans as has its secrecy. 263  Leaders in Libya's oil-rich eastern Barqa province have called for greater political
independence from Tripoli, raising fears that the state will fracture along tribal, religious or other historical lines.
Yet whichever situation ultimately results in Libya, 264  it was certainly not “crazy” for third-party states to recognize
the opposition in Benghazi as a legitimate government, even the only legitimate government. This is true as a matter of
historical state *389  practice, the interests of the states involved and the society of states generally.
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31 Richard A. Falk, The Six Legal Dimensions of the Vietnam War (1968) [[hereinafter Falk, Six Dimensions]. Indeed, this was a
more elaborate form of the doctrine as articulated by Vattel originally - that a police action by a state became a civil war subject
to international law when third-party states had to deal with it. See Wyndham Legh Walker, Recognition of Belligerency and
Grant of Belligerent Rights, 23 Transactions Grotius Soc'y, 177, 189 (1937) ( “Of the earlier writers on the topic of civil war
I will only say this--there are those who follow the lead of Vattel, who holds that once a civil insurrection has reached a point
at which it can be called a civil war, there is a war in fact; and it is open therefore to third States to treat the two belligerents
as if they were two contending States, and either to remain neutral or to aid whichever side has the juster [sic] cause.”).
32 See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 25, at 43.
33 Ingrid Detter, The Law of War 40 (2d ed. 2000) (providing that the doctrines of implied belligerency can be seen in NATO
action in Operation Allied Force where the Kosovo Liberation Army was implicitly acknowledged as a belligerent, since no
affirmation of Kosovar independence accompanied international institution-based intervention).
34 Higgins, supra note 13, at 170-71 (stating that the traditional approach often does not reflect modern reality as states “do not
wish to harness themselves to the legal consequences of a recognition of insurgency or belligerency”).
35 See Richard Falk, Introduction, in The International Law of Civil War, supra note 22, at 1, 14; see also A. C. Bundu,
Recognition of Revolutionary Authorities: Law and Practice of States, 27 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 18, 21, 25 (1978) (arguing that
in addition to being a legal act, “recognition of revolutionary governments [is also a] political act in the sense that each State
enjoys a large measure of freedom in deciding after the legal conditions have been satisfied, whether in a given case it is in its
national interest to accord recognition to the revolutionary authority in question”).
36 Falk, Six Dimensions, supra note 31, at 18; see also Bundu, supra note 35, at 21 (“The terms in vogue in popular parlance
are “insurrection”, “rebellion”, “military coup d'etat”, “civil war”, “civil strife”, “revolution”, “revolt”, “war of national
liberation”, and so on ... In international law it is doubtful whether any useful purpose can be achieved by attempting precise
distinctions of legal meaning between these terms.”). For a thorough analysis of how modern international humanitarian law
changed customary laws of war, see Anthony Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International
Humanitarian Law (2010).
37 Higgins, supra note 13, at 169.
38 See Christopher J. Le Mon, Unilateral Intervention by Invitation in Civil Wars: The Effective Control Test Tested, 35 N.Y.U.
J. Int'l L. & Pol. 741, 746-47 (2003); see also Kenneth D. Heath, Could We Have Armed the Kosovo Liberation Army? The
New Norms Governing Intervention in Civil War, 4 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 251, 271 (1999) (providing a useful graph
showing when and under which circumstances third-party states could extend military support to incumbent governments).
On the other hand, recognition of insurgency is the outcome both of the unwillingness of foreign States to treat the rebels as
mere law-breakers and of the “desire of those States to put their relations with the insurgents on a regular, although clearly
provisional, basis.” See Lauterpacht, supra note 30, at 270.
39 See generally Roscoe Ralph Oglesby, Internal War and the Search for Normative Order 1-17 (1971). There were, of course,
antecedents. According to Robert R. Wilson, “In peace treaties made by Spain in 1630 and 1659 with England and France,
respectively, there were acceptances of the rule that, if either party's subjects were in rebellion, the other should refuse them all
types of assistance.” Robert R. Wilson, Recognition of Insurgency and Belligerency, 31 Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proc. 136, 137 (1937).
40 See Oglesby, supra note 39, at 1.
41 See Dorothy Burne Goebel, Congress and Foreign Relations Before 1900, 289 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 22, 23 (1953).
42 First Edition of the American Prohibitory Act of 1775, The Manhattan Rare Book Co., http://www.manhattanrarebooks-
history.com/prohibitory_act.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
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43 Id. See also Ben Baack, Forging a Nation State: The Continental Congress and the Financing of the War of American
Independence, 54 The Economic History Review, 639, 641 (2001).
44 See Burne Goebel, supra note 41, at 22-23; see also Hugh F. Rankin, The Naval Flag of the American Revolution, 11 Wm.
& Mary Q. 339, 340 (1954) (describing the Continental Congress' efforts, “in response to the demands of impatient seamen,”
to make use of privateers even though there was “no recognized flag under which they could sail”).
45 See Burne Geobel, supra note 41, at 23 (recognizing that despite its best efforts, the Continental Congress' foreign efforts
slowly yielded results and, at that, only from countries acting out of self-interest: France and the Netherlands).
46 See Letter from Benjamin Franklin to R. Bernstorf (Dec. 22, 1779), in 3 The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American
Revolution 121, 121-22 (Jared Sparks ed., 1829).
47 Id. at 123.
48 Id. at 122-23.
49 Oglesby, supra note 39, at 2.
50 See David M. Griffiths, An American Contribution to the Armed Neutrality of 1780, 30 Russian Rev. 164, 170-72 (1971).
51 See id.
52 Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Naval Historical Ctr., http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/a7/alliance-i.htm
(last visited Aug. 23, 2012).
53 Id.
54 Oglesby, supra note 39, at 6.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 4, 7.
57 Id. at 6.
58 See id. at 4.
59 See, e.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, 53 Yale L.J. 385, 391 (1944) (noting the series of
revolts from Spanish authority during the nineteenth century and the ensuing debates regarding recognition of the new states);
see also Tim Matthewson, Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti, 140 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc. 22 (1996) (describing an early
example of American foreign policy on belligerency in the context of the conflict between Haiti and France).
60 See Brian R. Hamnett, Process and Pattern: A Re-Examination of the Ibero-American Independence Movements, 1808-1826
Process and Pattern: A Re-Examination of the Ibero-American Independence Movements, 1808-1826, 29 J. Latin Am. Stud.
279, 286 (1997) (explaining that the spread of independence movements in Latin American came after such movements in
North America and Europe).
61 Oglesby, supra note 39, at 8.
62 Dorothy Burne Goebel, British Trade to the Spanish Colonies, 1796-1823, 43 Am. Hist. Rev. Hist. Rev. 288, 299-300 (1938)
[hereinafter Burne Goebel, British Trade] (describing the regime's attempt to attract British support through favorable trade
practices).
63 See id. at 301 (noting that the Republic of Colombia declared free commerce after its independence).
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64 See id. at 300 (stating that, among other factors, the Latin American colonies' solicitation of foreign aid allowed Britain to
strengthen its position in the region).
65 See id. at 301.
66 D. A. G. Waddell, British Neutrality and Spanish-American Independence: The Problem of Foreign Enlistment, 19 J. Latin
Am. Stud. 1, 7 (1987).
67 See id.
68 See 1 Britain and the Independence of Latin America 1812-1830 10 (C.K. Webster ed., 1938) (detailing the explosion of
Britain's commercial interest in Latin America following the region's decolonization); see also Burne Goebel, British Trade,
supra note 62, at 295 (“Probably the greatest obstacle to such a development, however, lay in the competition of the Americans,
a circumstance which minimized the importance of the free ports as markets for the Spanish colonies. For the vessels of the
United States occupied a peculiarly favorable position.”).
69 See Waddell, supra note 66, at 6, 9 (explaining the political realities in London that set policymakers at odds with public
opinion).
70 Id. at 6.
71 See generally Javier Cuenca Esteban, Trends and Cycles in U.S. Trade with Spain and the Spanish Empire, 1790-1819, 44 J.
Econ. Hist. 521 (1984) (providing early quantitative history).
72 See Burne Goebel, British Trade, supra note 62, at 295 (“It was the United States alone that could with ease supply [Spain's
Caribbean colonies] the requisite thousands of barrels of wheat and flour, and as a result both Spanish creoles and British
colonials were forced to turn to the Americans.”); see also James W. Cortada, Economic Issues in Caribbean Politics: Rivalry
between Spain and the United States in Cuba, 1848-1898, 86 Revista de Historia de América 233, 234 (1978) (“Commercial
ties between the colony and the United States grew despite Spanish economic policies designed to restrict them while Cuba's
slave society linked it closely to the South.”); Linda K. Salvucci, Atlantic Intersections: Early American Commerce and
the Rise of the Spanish West Indies 79 Bus. Hist Rev 781, 782 (2005) (“However, it has become increasingly clear that
informed contemporaries regarded ports throughout the Spanish Empire, particularly those in Cuba, as desirable and lucrative
destinations for American exports and as sources of valuable imports, such as specie. Many American merchants, including
Robert Morris, the first superintendent of finance, traded with Spanish imperial ports for public and private gain.”).
73 William Neumann, United States Aid to the Chilean Wars of Independence, 27 Hisp. Am. Hist. Rev. 204, 204-05 (1947).
74 See id. at 205 (noting that American merchants were quick to seize upon new opportunities as they were legalized).
75 See John Bassett Moore, The Monroe Doctrine: Its Origin and Meaning 7 (1895) (noting that English merchants were inclined
to deal with new Latin American states despite their government's hesitance to legitimize such states, while the United States
had already done so).
76 See Greg Russell, John Quincy Adams and the Ethics of America's National Interest, 19 Rev. Int'l Stud. 23, 34
(1993); see also James Madison: Proclamation 21- Warning Against Unauthorized Military Expedition Against the
Dominions of Spain, September 1, 1815, Am. Presidency Project, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=65985#axzz1dWgLVeju.
77 Oglesby, supra note 39, at 9.
78 Neumann, supra note 73, at 206.
79 See Waddell, supra note 66, at 1 (describing Britain's methods of remaining neutral).
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80 See, e.g., Piero Gleijeses, The Limits of Sympathy: The United States and the Independence of Spanish America, 24 J. Latin
Am. Stud. 481, 486 (1992) (“Britain, then, had to prove its good faith to Spain and other European allies, and it did so by
enacting a ‘formidable array of laws and orders' that made it almost impossible for British subjects to render any assistance
to the Spanish American rebels.”).
81 See generally Andres Bello: The London Years 7-24 (John Lynch ed., 1982); William W. Kaufmann, British Policy and the
Independence of Latin America, 1804-1828 (Lewis P. Curtis ed., 1951); Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh,
1815-1822, at 405-23 (4th prtg. 1963) (discussing Britain's policy generally).
82 Lauterpacht, supra note 30v, at 182.
83 See Oglesby, supra note 39, at 33.
84 See generally 4 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 383, 383-84 (C. Vann Woodward ed., 1988)
(“Britain imported three-quarters of its cotton from the American South ... British and French officials exchanged worried
views about the probable impact of a cotton famine.”); Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States
1790-1860 (1966); David G. Surdam, King Cotton: Monarch or Pretender? The State of the Market for Raw Cotton on the
Eve of the American Civil War, 51 Econ. Hist. Rev. 113, 113-32 (1998).
85 See Nathan L. Ferris, The Relations of the United States with South America During the American Civil War, 21 Hisp. Am.
Hist. Rev. 51, 52 (1941) (demonstrating that both the Union and the Confederacy recognized the relevance of their respective
relations with Latin America); Wilbur Devereux Jones, The British Conservatives and the American Civil War, 58 Am. Hist.
Rev. 527, 528 (1953) (claiming that British concern for American interest in Canada steered some to sympathize with the
Confederacy); see also McPherson, supra note 84, at 553 (describing French partisanship for the South because of imperial
aims in Mexico and elsewhere); Kathryn Abby Hanna, Incidents of the Confederate Blockade, 11 J. S. Hist. 214, 215 (1945)
(quoting Napoleon III, “It is to our interests that the United States be powerful and prosperous, but it is not at all to our
interest that it should control the entire Gulf of Mexico, should dominate from there the Antilles and South America, and
should be the sole distributor of the products of the New World.”).
86 See, e.g., Kinley J. Brauer, British Mediation and the American Civil War: A Reconsideration, 38 J. S. Hist. 49 (1972) (“During
the Fall of 1862 Great Britain seriously considered intervening in the American Civil War. Union defeats in northern Virginia
and a Confederate advance toward Washington, coupled with growing domestic economic problems created by the cotton
famine, led Lord Palmerston, the prime minister, and Lord John Russell, the foreign secretary, to propose to the Cabinet that
Britain in conjunction with other European powers offer mediation to the Americans.”).
87 See Stuart Anderson, 1861: Blockade vs. Closing the Confederate Ports, 41 Military Aff. 190, 190 (1977).
88 See id. (presenting the positions of Lincoln's cabinet members, particularly Attorney General Welles and Secretary Seward).
89 See generally id.
90 See id.
91 See McPherson, supra note 84, at 274 (“On April 15 Lincoln issued a proclamation calling 75,000 militiamen into national
service for ninety days to put down an insurrection ‘too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings.”’).
92 See Anderson, supra note 87, at 192.
93 See id.
94 .See Lauterpacht, supra note 30, at 177.
95 Anderson, supra note 87, at 190.
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96 Oglesby, supra note 39, at 34.
97 See Wilson, supra note 39, at 139 (noting discrepancies between the arguments for what is required in cases of belligerent
recognition); see also McPherson, supra note 84, at 388 (acknowledging that regardless of legal theories and arguments, to
some “[t]he question of belligerent rights is one, not of principle, but of fact”).
98 See Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian
Law, 183 Mil. L. Rev. 66, 75 (2005) (“Prior to [the Geneva Conventions of 1949], traditional international law required that
the belligerency of parties to an internal armed conflict be afforded either formal or tacit recognition before humanitarian
obligations could be said to exist”) (emphasis added). See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Civil War as Paradigm: Reestablishing
the Rule of Law at the End of the Cold War, 5 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 129 (1996).
99 See Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 55 (1946) (recognizing that traditionally, “states [are] free to accord or
withhold the recognition of new governments”).
100 See Brauer, supra note 86, at 53 (demonstrating that self-interest, not international legal theory, was the driving force behind
British policymaking).
101 Quincy Wright, The American Civil War (1861-65), in The International Law of Civil War, supra note 26, at 80 (“cultural,
political, economic, legal, military, and moral” considerations favored British recognition of the Confederacy's independence).
102 Lauterpacht, supra note 30, at 178.
103 The Declaration of Paris provided that: “1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished; 2. The neutral flag covers the enemy's
goods, with the exception of contraband of war; 3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable
to capture under enemy's flag; 4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a forge
sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.” Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 60 B.S.P.
155 [hereinafter Declaration of Paris], available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/105? OpenDocument. The United States
was invited to join the treaty--the Declaration of Paris--but refused to do so until an additional term was included which
protected private property at sea. See Charles Francis Adams, Seward and the Declaration of Paris: A Forgotten Diplomatic
Episode 7, 8 (1912).
104 See Adams, supra note 103, at 9-10 (“On April 24 Seward instructed representatives abroad, recounting the Marcy proposal
and expressing the hope that it still might meet with a favourable reception, but authorizing them to enter into conventions for
American adherence to the Declaration of 1856 on the four points alone. This instruction was sent to the Ministers in Great
Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Denmark; and on May 10 to the Netherlands.”).
105 See generally The Declaration of Paris Negotiation, historian.net, http://historion.net/great-britain-and-american-civil-war/
chapter-v-declaration-paris-negotiation (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (stating that Seward instructed his representatives abroad
to continue pursuing agreement on the protection of private property but, failing that, allowed them to “enter into conventions
for American adherence to [the Declaration of Paris] on the four points alone”).
106 See generally Brauer, supra note 86 (discussing the British theories behind mediation of the U.S. Civil War).
107 See Oglesby, supra note 39, at 41.
108 The Brig Army Warwick (Prize Cases), 67 U.S. 635, 670 (1863).
109 United States v. Tropic Wind, 28 F. Cas. 218, 221 (C.C.D.D.C. 1861).
110 See T. S. Woolsey, The Consequences of Cuban Belligerency, 5 Yale L.J. 182, 183 (1896) (“Thus, early in our Civil War, the
Sumter put in at Curacao, Holland, having recognized the belligerency of the Confederacy.”). See generally Lynn M. Case
& Warren F. Spencer, The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy (1970) (noting that Foreign Secretary Lord John
Russell informed American minister Dallas on May 1 that France intended to follow British actions toward the United States).
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111 See, e.g., Mayo W. Hazeltine, What Shall Be Done about Cuba, 163 The North American Review 731, 733 (1896) (noting that
despite resolutions from Congress (and other European powers) for recognition of belligerency in Cuba, President Cleveland
refused).
112 O'Rourke, supra note 23, at 399 (“But, once an insurrection acquires sufficient force and permanency, and the interests of
third Powers are affected thereby, recognition of belligerency is perfectly justifiable in the eyes of international law. It would be
futile to attack the propriety of this principle.”); Robert Wilson, Recognition of Insurgency and Belligerency. 31 Proceedings
of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969) 136 (1937) (“When [revolution] does happen,
other States may be affected in such a way that there is need of fixing the course which they propose to take with respect
to the contending parties. To the extent that the possible courses to be followed can be made the subject of rules previously
agreed upon, situations arising will be regularized and the possibilities of international friction lessened. What has been done
in the past about recognition of insurgency and belligerency has therefore more than mere historical significance.”); Compare
James W. Garner, Questions of International Law in the Spanish Civil War, 31 AJ.I.L. 105 (1937) (“Adverting to Mr. Noel-
Baker's statement that it was the traditional policy of the British Government-which policy, he said, was in accord with the
practice of other states and with the rules of international law-to refrain from recognizing the belligerency of insurgents, Sir
John stated that he could not accept this statement of British policy as correct. In fact, he asserted, it had always been the
policy of the British Government to regard itself as free to recognize or to refuse to recognize a state of belligerency as it might
judge to be in its own interests and, in the language of Westlake, ‘the general political good of the world.”’);Walker supra note
31 (“The present conflict in Spain has forced into prominence the question of what is spoken of as the granting of belligerent
rights to the parties to a civil war-the topic of recognition of belligerency. In recent correspondence in the Times a number
of writers whose names entitled their views to some consideration put forward somewhat divergent views upon the matter,
and supported their opinions by the giving of certain information as to past history. It may, however, be that even following
that correspondence there remained some, like myself, who still felt themselves with those of whom the poet sang- ‘the hungry
sheep look up and are not fed “.).
113 See Hersh Lauterpacht, Recognition of Insurgents as a De Facto Government, 3 the Modern Law Review 1-2 (1939) (“In
the first instance, while there were present most of the requirements imposing upon third States the duty to recognise a status
of belligerency, Great Britain and other countries were prevented from granting belligerent rights owing to the circumstance
that the struggle had ceased from its very commencement to be a civil war in the established sense of the term. The result was
that the rebellious forces, while denied the exercise of belligerent rights on the high seas, were in other respects treated as a
community engaged in lawful warfare.”).
114 Lauterpacht, supra note 30, at 175-77, 240-43. Even then, Lauterpacht conceded that at least 9 prominent international law
scholars disagreed with him. Id. at 241.
115 See Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A. J. Thomas, Jr., International Legal Aspects of the Civil War in Spain, 1936-39, in The
International Law of Civil War, supra note 24, at 111.
116 See Oglesby, supra note 39, at 104.
117 Garner, supra note 112, at 67.
118 Van Wynen Thomas & Thomas, supra note 115, at 114.
119 Id. at 113.
120 Id. at 115-16.
121 See id. at 117 (referring to Russia, the United States, and Mexico).
122 O'Rourke, supra note 23, at 412.
123 Lauterpacht, supra note 30, at 240 (“The considerations, based both on practice and on principle, in favour of the legal
character of recognition of belligerency - i.e. in particular, in favor of the legal right of the insurgents to recognition - are so
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cogent that, notwithstanding the contrary tendency in matters of recognition generally, the legal view of the recognition of
belligerency is supported by what is probably the majority of writers.”).
124 O'Rourke, supra note 23, at 413.
125 See Bundu, supra note 35, at 19 (listing at least thirty civil wars, revolutions or similar events in Africa alone from 1945 to the
time of writing); see also Howard J. Taubenfeld, International Actions and Neutrality, 47 Am. J. Int'l. L. 377, 384-96 (1953)
(explaining how the U.N. Charter changed customary norms although conceding that the points remain disputed).
126 Fraleigh, supra note 26, at 194-95.
127 Id. at 195.
128 Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict 80-81 (2002) (noting that in the Nigerian Civil War, the Nigerian
government issue a Code of Conduct stating that the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict, and both the government
and the belligerents generally observed this in practice).
129 Lauterpacht, supra note 30, at 176.
130 See Fred W. Anderson, The Hinge of the Revolution: George Washington Confronts a People's Army, 1 Mass. Hist. Rev
21, 24 (1999) (quoting the Continental Congress's general orders establishing the Continental Army); Daniel E. Sutherland,
Guerilla Warfare, Democracy, and the Fate of the Confederacy, 68 J. S. Hist. 259, 266 (2002) (noting that modern scholars
believe that the disciplined Continental Army--and not military irregulars-- deserved credit for the defeat of the British).
131 Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity,
92 Am. J. Int'l L. 213, 217 (1998) (citing to Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon's statement that Lieber's doctrine
of military necessity was insufficient justification for the atrocities committed during the American Civil War). While the
Confederacy generally abided by norms prevalent at the time, an important exception was the vicious treatment of black
prisoners of war. See McPherson, supra note 84, at 566.
132 Harry Hansen et al., The Civil War: A History 54 (2002); see also Sutherland, supra note 130, at 276 (noting that though
irregular warfare was popular during the civil war, Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee insisted on warfare through an organized
military).
133 See generally Brauer, supra note 86 (arguing that the Union victory at the Battle of Antiem was one of several factors the
British took into account in deciding to stay neutral rather than mediate during the Civil War).
134 In a particularly biting critique of Lauterpacht's Recognition, Josef L. Kunz stated that “under positive international law
there is no right to recognition by new states or de facto governments, nor is there a legal duty to recognize them,” and that
Lauterpacht's “assertion of a right to recognition and a duty to recognize, is certainly entirely untenable as not being in accord
with positive international law.” See Josef L. Kunz, Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht's, “Recognition in International Law”,
44 Am. J. Int'l L. 713 (1950).
135 See generally Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace 205-314 (1997) (providing a comprehensive taxonomy for intellectual
traditions that guided foreign policy decision making and diplomacy).
136 Lauterpacht, supra note 59, at 385 (inferring that some revolutionaries, in effect, “fulfill[ed] the conditions of statehood as
required by international law”).
137 For the classic exposition of Classical Realism, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power
and Peace (5th ed., rev. 1978), and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979) (modifying Classical Realism
by arguing that states may not, as Morgenthau proposes, inherently seek more power, but that the anarchical international
system of states explains why states seek to maximize relative gains and have difficulty cooperating).
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138 See Taubenfeld, supra note 125, at 378 (“A neutral also had the right to trade with a belligerent except as prevented by an
effective blockade.”).
139 The most recent, seminal critique of international lawyers' tendency to overestimate the normative force of international
law, particularly customary international law, is Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113, 1115 (1999) (“Our theory suggests that international behavioral regularities associated with
[[customary international law] may reflect coincidence of interest or coercion. These cases have no normative content, for
states independently pursue their self-interest without generating gains from interaction. The theory also suggests that some
international behavioral regularities associated with CIL will reflect cooperation or coordination, but these regularities will
arise in bilateral, not multilateral, interactions.”).
140 Commerce as a fundamental international interest was derived from enlightenment principles articulated best by Adam Smith,
who argued that liberalization of commerce would lead to ever higher levels of well-being in all countries. See Adam Smith,
An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 181 (J.R. M'Culloch ed., 4th ed. 1850) (“Commerce and
manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among
the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived in a continual state of war with their neighbors, and of servile dependency
upon their superiors.”). But see Andrew Wyatt-Walter, Adam Smith and the Liberal Tradition in International Relations, 22
Rev. Int'l Stud. 5 (1996) (suggesting that Smith believed that even under a regime of liberalized trade, the ultimate aim was
aggrandizement of the state).
141 Peter Onuf & Nicholas Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776-1814
104 (1993) (noting that revolutionaries “understood that their true interest lay in promoting a more peaceful, lawful and
prosperous international system. This meant perfecting, not rejecting, the principle of national sovereignty”).
142 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to an “Agent of American Cruisers” (May 30, 1780), in 3 The Diplomatic Correspondence
of the American Revolution, supra note 46, at 142.
143 Oglesby, supra note 39, at 6 (citing Baron Charles de Martens, Nouvelles Causes Célèbres du Droit des Gens 370 (1843)).
144 W. E. Butler, Grotius and the Law of the Sea, in Hugo Grotius and International Relations 213 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990).
The Dutch specifically referred to this “axiom” in their response to the British. See Oglesby, supra note 39, at 6.
145 Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War 270 (1996) (noting that France and Spain viewed the revolution in terms of their own
economic and political self-interests vis-à-vis the British).
146 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 139, at 1123 (“States independently pursuing their own interests will engage in symmetrical
or identical actions that do not harm anyone, simply because they gain nothing by deviating from those actions.”).
147 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers 117 (1989).
148 Oglesby, supra note 39, at 4.
149 Id. Roscoe Oglesby, in comparing the two cases, suggests that the conduct of Denmark “was not that of a neutral, whereas
that of Holland was more nearly so.”
150 Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War 270 (1996).
151 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers 150 (1989) (noting evidence that the British navy and economy were
“eroded in these years.”).
152 Oglesby, supra note 39, at 6 (citing Martens, Nouvelles Causes Célèbres du Droit des Gens).
153 See William Cullen Dennis, The Right of Citizens of Neutral Countries to Sell and Export Arms and Munitions of War to
Belligerents, 60 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 168, 170-71 (1915) (commenting that international law permits neutral
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states to ship arms to belligerents on the high seas). The rules regarding the rights of neutrals became highly codified in
U.S. domestic law. See, e.g., Norman J. Padelford, Neutrality, Belligerency, and the Panama Canal, 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 55, 56
(1941) (listing the various prohibitions on citizens for violating neutrality including “taking part in hostilities, and observing
the statutes and treaties of the United States, as well as the law of nations.”); Albert H. Washburn, The American View of
Neutrality, 2 Va. L. Rev. 165, 166 (1914) (“The immediate result of this attempt to exercise belligerent privileges, inconsistent
with neutrality, was the passing by Congress in the following year of the law of June 5, 1794, forbidding within the territory
or jurisdiction of the United States the acceptance and exercise of a commission, the enlistment of men, the fitting out and
arming of vessels and the setting on foot of military expeditions in the service of any foreign prince or state with which the
United States was at peace.”).
154 See Lauterpacht, supra note 30, at 177, 187 (observing that states rarely express their recognition of belligerents through
proclamations but may do so through other means, such as recognizing the right to blockade).
155 See David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order 48 (1993) (noting the American view at the time that free trade principles
would foster more peaceful relations between states).
156 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to “Agent American Cruisers,” supra note 142, at 142.
157 Daniel G. Lang & Greg Russell, The Ethics of Power in American Diplomacy: The Statecraft of John Quincy Adams, 52 Rev.
Pol. 3, 13 (1990) (quoting John Quincy Adams as President, “the principles of justice, humanity and Christianity demanded,
in particular, that free or neutral ships should make free goods and the neutral goods should be safe in enemy ships”).
158 Lauterpacht, supra note 30, at 186.
159 Id. at 187; see also Walker, supra note 31, at 182 (“But at any rate by the beginning of 1815 it seems clear that the insurgents
were in fact interfering with British shipping, and the British Government were avoiding awkward questions by advising naval
officers to use their own discretion, to protect lawful trade as far as possible, but not to commit acts of hostility against the
commissioned insurgent cruisers.”).
160 See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 84 (1994). Most governments at least seemed to adopt the outlook of Austrian Chancellor
Clemens von Metternich, who saw revolution, and the French Revolution in particular, as a dangerous aberration threatening
the more reliable ancient doctrine that international decision-making was best left to like-minded sovereigns.
161 Oglesby, supra note 39, at 15-16.
162 Id. at 16.
163 See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 635 (1818) (affirming that ships on the high seas belonging to belligerents must be
able to identify themselves in the same way as ships of an established government would).
164 President Monroe's first annual message read in part “[The United States] have regarded the contest not in the light of an
ordinary insurrection or rebellion, but as a civil war between parties nearly equal, having as to neutral powers equal rights.
Our ports have been open to both.” Oglesby, supra note 39, at 12.
165 Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283, 337 (1822) (“The government of the United States has recognized the existence of a civil
war between Spain and her colonies, and has avowed a determination to remain neutral between the parties, and to allow to
each the same rights of asylum and hospitality and intercourse.”).
166 See Gleijeses, supra note 80, at 481.
167 As with many episodes herein described, the national governments could not always enforce military prohibitions, even when
earnestly trying to do so. See Neumann, supra note 73, at 204 (1947) (“In Chile at least, the aid given in the form of men,
ships and supplies from the United States comprised a very substantial contribution to the cause of independence, and must
be weighed in any evaluation of the role of this country as compared to Britain.”).
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168 See Arnold D. McNair, The Law Relating to the Civil War in Spain, 53 L.Q. Rev. 471, 484 (1937). Interestingly, in their
analysis of customary international law, Goldsmith and Posner do not focus on the actions of third-party states toward civil
war, but rather on the position of the incumbent belligerent, the United States. It is fair to say that when a state is waging war,
it is more likely to interpret international law in ways that lean toward its individual, as opposed to, multilateral interests, as
indeed the United States did. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 139, at 1140-44.
169 Wright, supra note 101, at 81.
170 Id. at 86.
171 Id. at 87-88. In fairness, historians, diplomats and partisans have long traded barbs over whether and to what extent Britain
allowed its manufacturers to build war ships for the Confederacy. See McPherson, supra note 84, at 546-49 (remarking that the
Palmerston government “shut its eyes” to the building of Confederate commerce raiders in pro-Confederacy Liverpool); see
also Charles S. C. Bowen, The ‘Alabama’ Claims and Arbitration Considered from a Legal Point of View 5 (1868) (noting the
“swarming” Confederate agents in Liverpool that attempted to acquire ships for blockade running as well as for war-making).
172 Wright, supra note 101, at 88.
173 Brauer, supra note 86, at 55-56 (recounting that after the Union defeat at the Second battle of Bull Run, Palmerston, Russell,
and Gladstone advocated a joint European mediation to push for an armistice or, if the Union rejected it, recognition of the
Confederacy; however, several other British Cabinet members rejected the plan in favor of a “wait and see” approach, as did
Thouvenel, the French foreign minister).
174 Dennis, supra note 12, at 206 (“[F]ull recognition as a de jure government should be withheld until the armed issue has been
resolved conclusively in favor of the permanency of the new government. Only the fact of control and acceptance by the people
is vital, not the formalities of establishment.”).
175 See generally Walker, supra note 31, at 200 (stating “the parent State itself could announce to the world the existence of a
civil war and its intention to exercise those war rights derived both from its own statehood and from the fact of the existence
of war.”).
176 Ulysses S. Grant, State of the Union Address (Dec. 7, 1875) [[hereinafter State of the Union 1875] (“Applying to the existing
condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recognized by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been observed
by nations of dignity, honesty, and power when free from sensitive or selfish and unworthy motives, I fail to find in the
insurrection the existence of such a substantial political organization, real, palpable, and manifest to the world, having the
forms and capable of the ordinary functions of government toward its own people and to other states, with courts for the
administration of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such material, such occupation of
territory, as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious insurrection or occasional skirmishes and place it on
the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it.”).
177 See Doyle, supra note 135, at 138-39 (noting that unlike Hobbes and Machiavelli, Rousseau saw war as symptomatic of
“variations in the constitution of the state”).
178 The term “international law” is attributed to Bentham who meant to distinguish this term from “the law of nations” as explored
by Blackstone; in doing so, Bentham sought to highlight that international law involves transactions between sovereigns,
rather than just the comparative laws of all nations. See M. W. Janis, Commentary, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of
“International Law”, 78 Am. J. Int'l L. 405, 408-09 (1984).
179 Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 4, Chapter 5 (“The law of nations is a system of rules, deductible by natural reason, and
established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world ... And those acts of parliament, which have from
time to time been made to enforce this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of its decisions, are not to be considered
introductive of any new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom ...”); See also
Tom J. Farer, Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Intervention in Civil Strife, 82 Harv. L. Rev.
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511, 513 (1969) (“Today, as in the eighteenth century, the primary rules of international society can be induced from treaties,
the practice of states (i.e. tacit agreements about appropriate behavior under defined circumstances), from the ubiquity of
certain norms in domestic law, from the writings of scholars and propagandists, and from the public declarations of foreign
policy decision makers.”); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law:
A Reconciliation, 95 Am. J. Int'l Law, 757-91 (2001); compare Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1113, 1118 (1999) (arguing that customary international law is not driven by a
sense of obligation). Goldsmith and Posner are almost certainly correct that international lawyers overstate the extent to
which sovereign states are driven by opinio juris, however, they themselves may overstate the extent to which international
law represents more than just interest convergence on narrow issues. For example, in Goldsmith and Posner's analysis of
customary international law regulating the Union blockade, they argue that the Union's blockade was not effective under
then-understood principles of customary international law. It is certainly true that Frank Owsley, a civil war historian, wrote
that the Union blockade was “scarcely a respectable paper blockade” and “old Abe's ... practical joke on the world.” But,
James McPherson, for example, citing a Confederate naval officer notes that the blockade “shut the Confederacy out from
the world, deprived it of supplies, weakened its military and naval strength” and concluded that “historical opinion leans
toward [the blockade's effectiveness],” supra note 84, at 381. Russell declared of the blockade: “The fact that various ships
may have successfully escaped through it ... will not of itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one by international
law” so long as it was enforced by a number of ships “sufficient really to prevent access to [a port] or to create an evident
danger of entering or leaving it.” (emphasis in original) Id. at 385; see also Robert Hunt Sprinkle, Two Cold Wars and Why
They Ended Differently, 25 Review of International Studies 623, 631 (1999) (“We know that the international cotton market
became glutted in the early 1860s and that Southern production, first embargoed and then blockaded, proved easier to replace
than expected.”).
180 See The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 693-94 (1863) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“In the breaking
out of a rebellion against the established Government, the usage in all civilized countries, in its first stages, is to suppress it by
confining the public forces and the operations of the Government against those in rebellion, and at the same time extending
encouragement and support to the loyal people with a view to their co-operation in putting down the insurgents. This course is
not only the dictate of wisdom, but of justice. This was the practice of England in Monmouth's rebellion in the reign of James
the Second, and in the rebellions of 1715 and 1745, by the Pretender and his son, and also in the beginning of the rebellion of
the Thirteen Colonies of 1776. It is a personal war against the individuals engaged in resisting the authority of the Government.
This was the character of the war of our Revolution till the passage of the Act of the Parliament of Great Britain of the 16th of
George Third, 1776. By that act all trade and commerce with the Thirteen Colonies was interdicted and all ships and cargoes
belonging to the inhabitants subjected to forfeiture as if the same were the ships and effects of open enemies. From this time
the war became a territorial civil war between the contending parties, with all the rights of war known to the law of nations.”).
181 See Walker, supra note 31, at 183 (“It must be noticed, too, that the stability of some of the insurgent Governments varied
considerably from time to time. In certain provinces Spanish power had a moment of recovery, and it was not until after 1819
that the hopes of Spain had definitely waned. In view both of the general political situation in Europe and the uncertainties
attending the position in South America there were sound reasons for caution, and the consequent delay is entirely politically
understandable.”).
182 See id. at 186 (“Insurgents backed by a stable political organisation had been treated as being what they were in fact, and
there had been no interference with the maritime operations of such insurgents when carrying on their operations according
to the ordinary usages of war, even though their actions involved the seizure by unrecognised authorities of the ships and
goods of British subjects.”); see also Ulysses S. Grant, Special Address (June 13, 1869) (remarking with regard to the Cuban
insurrection: “The existence of a Legislature representing any popular constituency is more than doubtful.”).
183 David P. Fidler, Desperately Clinging to Grotian and Kantian Sheep: Rousseau's Attempted Escape from the State of War, in
Classical Theories of International Relations 125 (Ian Clark & Iver B. Neumann eds., 1996); see also Howard Williams & Ken
Booth, Kant: Theorist Beyond Limits, in Classical Theories of International Relations 77 (1996) (“Thus a constitution has to
be created which reins in the ruler who is also at the same time regulating (coercively, if necessary) the activities of citizens.”).
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184 Oglesby, supra note 39, at 19.
185 Indeed, this nascent form developed into well-established law after the ascendancy of the United Nations as a norm-creating
organization. See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 Am. J. Int'l. L. 705, 737 (1988) (“Similarly,
the legal adviser to the Secretary-General prepared a memorandum explaining the rules applicable to accepting or rejecting
the credentials of a delegation when there is doubt about their validity, for example, during a civil war when there may be
two adversary claimants. In such situations, too, UN members should be guided by Charter Article 4, the legal adviser said.
Moreover, ‘[w]here a revolutionary government presents itself as representing a State, in rivalry to an existing government, the
question at issue should be which of these two governments in fact is in a position to employ the resources and direct the people
of the State in fulfillment of the obligations of membership. In essence, this means an inquiry as to whether the new government
exercises effective authority within the territory of the State and is habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population.”’).
186 See Dennis, supra note 12, at 204, 205 (arguing that Jefferson's view--that political realities, not theories ought to drive
international relations--may have been one of the United States' most important contributions to international law).
187 See Oglesby, supra note 39, at 19. For a good summary of both internal and external U.S. perspectives on the Greek conflict,
see Angelo Repousis, “The Cause of the Greeks”: Philadelphia and the Greek War for Independence, 1821-1828, 123 Penn.
Mag. Hist. & Biography 333 (1999).
188 Oglesby, supra note 39, at 19.
189 Id. at 20-21.
190 Doyle, supra note 135, at 231.
191 See Walker, supra note 31, at 208-09 (asserting that Britain never intentionally recognized belligerency in Spain).
192 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, in The International Regulation of Civil Wars, supra note 13, at 30.
193 See Doyle, supra note 135, at 211, 213-29.
194 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, On the Law of Nations 34-35 (1990) (citing President Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session
of Congress (April 2, 1917)).
195 Concurrent Resolutions of Congress (March 4, 1863) in 2 Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual
Message of the President to the First Session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress 813 (1864).
196 Montague Bernard, A Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain During the American Civil War 467-68 (1870)
(quoting M. Drouyn de Lhuys of France in an address to the British Government).
197 P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe 35-36 (1986).
198 Thomas, supra note 192, at 30.
199 See George F. Kennan, Diplomacy in the Modern World, in International Rules: Approaches from International Law and
International Relations 99, 101 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996).
200 See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 101 (1984)
(emphasizing the importance of interest convergence in the establishment and sustainability of international institutions). See
generally Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Peter
J. Katzenstein ed.,1989) (discussing interest convergence in the context of international environmental law).
201 The role of the International Red Cross as well as the United Nations in civil conflicts has grown substantially. See generally
Oscar Schachter, The United Nations and Internal Conflict, in Law and Civil War in the Modern World 401-44 (John Norton
Moore ed., 1974) (discussing the role of the United Nations in internal conflicts during its first twenty-five years).
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202 See Taubenfeld, supra note 125, at 384 (citing James Leslie Brierly, The Outlook for International Law 93 (1944) (“The details
of such a minimum obligation would require careful consideration, but at the least it would mean that every state [party to the
United Nations Charter] would be bound to deny to an aggressor the rights that neutrals have traditionally been expected to
accord to belligerents.”); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 5 (“All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in
any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which
the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.”). But see Taubenfeld, supra note 125, at 385 (recognizing that
regardless of the strength of the international legal language giving effect to the United Nations, its impact remains subject
to comity).
203 Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 18 (1994) (“One example is the central importance of the veto in
the Security Council. The veto (or principle of unanimity) is a legal rule embodied in the Charter for political reasons and
used (or, some would say, abused) by the permanent members primarily in their national interests.”); Keith L. Sellen, The
United Nations Security Council Veto in the New World Order, 138 Mil. L. Rev. 187, 224 n.224 (1992) (“Interested members,
however, also may vote on questions under Chapter VII, which involve Security Council sanctions ....”).
204 See Eleanor Lumsden, An Uneasy Peace: Multilateral Military Intervention in Civil Wars, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 795,
796-97 (2003) (identifying some of these episodes: (1) Belgium and the United States in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(“D.R.C.”) in 1964; (2) the U.S. and Organization of American States (“OAS”) in the Dominican Republic in 1965; (3) France
and Belgium in Zaire in 1978; (4) the United States and Allied Forces in Iraq in 1991; and (5) NATO in Kosovo in 1998).
205 It is probably not consequential, for this thesis at least, that the form of exit was death. The U.N. Security Council's referral
of Qadhafi to the International Criminal Court, or even the probable outcome of a trial in Libya, would be his effective
removal from influence nationally, regionally and internationally. Timeline: Moammar Gadhafi's Final Moments, CNN
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-20/africa/world_africa_libya-death-timeline_1_national-transitional-council-
officials-moammar-gadhafi-sirte?_ s=PM:AFRICA.
206 Vivienne Walt, How Libya's Second City Became the First to Revolt, Time (Feb. 22, 2011), http:// www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,2052980,00.html (detailing the origins of the Libyan unrest); see also Kareem Fahim, In the Cradle of Libya's
Uprising, the Rebels Learn to Govern Themselves, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/world/
africa/25benghazi.html (explaining that rebels and average citizens in Benghazi set up their own informal system of law, order,
and governance within days of the initial uprising); Libya: At Least 370 Missing From Country's East, Human Rights Watch
(Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/30/libya-least-370-missing-countrys-east (“The Libyan government has
released no information about the number or location of people it has arrested across the country since anti-government
protests began on February 15 in eastern Libya and then devolved into heavy fighting between the government and armed
opposition groups.”).
207 The report of deaths and injured vary widely by source, many of which admit they cannot confirm exact numbers or
events. See, e.g., Douglas Birch, U.S. Condemns Crackdowns on Mideast Protests, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 2011, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/20/AR2011022001049.html (“Libyan forces fired machine-guns at
mourners marching in a funeral for anti-government protesters in Benghazi Sunday, a day after commandos and foreign
mercenaries pummeled demonstrators with assault rifles and other heavy weaponry. A physician in Benghazi told The
Associated Press that at least 200 had been killed in demonstrations against the regime of Moammar Gadhafi.”).
208 Gaddafi Defiant as State Teeters, Aljazeera, http:// english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/02/20112235434767487.html (last
modified Feb. 23, 2011).
209 Id. (“Libyan diplomats across the world have either resigned in protest at the use of violence against citizens, or renounced
Gaddafi's leadership, saying that they stand with the protesters. Late on Tuesday night, General Abdul-Fatah Younis, the
country's interior minister, became the latest government official to stand down, saying that he was resigning to support what
he termed as the ‘February 17 revolution’ ... Mustapha Abdeljalil, the country's justice minister, had resigned in protest at
the ‘excessive use of violence’ against protesters, and diplomats at Libya's mission to the United Nations called on the Libyan
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army to help remove ‘the tyrant Muammar Gaddafi’. A group of army officers has also issued a statement urging soldiers to
‘join the people’ and remove Gaddafi from power.”).
210 See, e.g., Birch, supra note 207 (“State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said the U.S. has received a number of credible
reports that hundreds of people have been killed and injured in the unrest, although the extent of the violence is unknown
because Libya has denied access to international media and human rights groups. Crowley said the U.S. has raised ‘strong
objections to the use of lethal force against peaceful protesters. The European Union also denounced the Libyan government's
response to the protests, with the EU's foreign policy chief calling for an end to the violence.”).
211 Sarah Margon & Jessica Kahlenberg, The State of Play in Libya, Ctr. for Am. Progress (July 15, 2011), http://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/libya_state_of_play.html (noting that as of July 15, Libya was effectively divided
between the opposition in the east and Gaddafi's regime in the west).
212 Fact Sheet: UN Security Council Resolution 1970, Libya Sanctions, U.S. Mission to the U.N. (Feb. 26, 2011), http://
usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2011/157194.htm (citing S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011)).
213 Id.
214 See generally What is International Humanitarian Law?, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (July 2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/other/what_ is_ihl.pdf (“International humanitarian law applies only to armed conflict; it does not cover internal
tensions or disturbances such as isolated acts of violence. The law applies only once a conflict has begun, and then equally
to all sides regardless of who started the fighting.”).
215 See Ian Black & Owen Bowcott, Libya Protests: Massacres Reported as Gaddafi Imposes News Blackout, Guardian.co.uk
(Feb. 18, 2011), http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/18/libya-protests-massacres-reported (“Umm Muhammad, a
political activist in Benghazi, told the Guardian that 38 people had died there ... ‘This is a bloody massacre--in Benghazi, in
al-Bayda, all over Libya. They are releasing prisoners from the jails to attack the demonstrators. The whole Libyan people
want to bring down this regime’ ... ‘[and on that day] a number of conspirators were executed. They were locked up in the
holding cells of a police station because they resisted, and some died burning inside the building.”’).
216 See Libya: Barack Obama Announces Gaddafi Sanctions, BBC News (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-12585949 (“Secretary General Ban ... said that 22,000 people had fled Libya via Tunisia, and a further 15,000 via
Egypt”).
217 France Recognizes Libya Opposition as Legitimate Representatives of the People, Haaretz.com (Mar. 10,
2011), http:// www.haaretz.com/news/international/france-recognizes-libya-opposition-as-legitimate-representatives-of-the-
people-1.348338. The group has been called the “Libyan National Council,” the “Interim Governing Council,” the “Interim
Governing Council,” and the “Transnational National Council.” See, e.g., id.; James Blitz, Libyan Opposition Wins Wider
Recognition, Fin. Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/678bd348-ae38-11e0-8752-00144feabdc0.html #axzz1azFAmNhG
(last updated July 15, 2011).
218 See Sarkozy's Libyan Surprise, Economist (Mar. 14, 2011), http:// www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/03/
france_and_libya.
219 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc., P 8, S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
220 Security Council Approves No-Fly Zone, supra note 17.
221 S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 6, P 4 (emphasis added).
222 Id. at P 2.
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223 Qatar Recognises Libyan Rebels After Oil Deal, Aljazeera, http:// english.aljazeera.net/news/
middleeast/2011/03/201132814450241767.html (last modified Mar. 28, 2011) (quoting the outgoing Gulf Co-Operation
Council Secretary General, Abdulrahman al-Attiyah).
224 See id.
225 Sherine El Madany, Italian FM Pledges Financial, Fuel Aid to Libyan Rebels, Reuters, May 31, 2011 available
at http:// af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFLDE74U15820110531? pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0 (‘In that
memorandum, Italy not only confirmed its recognition of the council as the only representative of the Libyan people but also
we took a commitment (from) the Italian company Eni and an Italian bank UniCredit to provide the council for the needs
of the Libyan people.”).
226 Scott Peterson, U.S. Recognition of Rebels Could Bring More Funds, July 15, 2011 available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Middle-East/2011/0715/US-recognition-of-Libya-rebels-could-bring-more-funds. (“Adhering to those assurances may
not be easy, judging by issues that have recently dogged the TNC. ‘Life's too comfortable in Benghazi. No real leadership.
And too much suspicion and posturing by the individuals in and around the Council,’ says one European analyst in Benghazi
who asked not to be named. The result is an ‘astonishing lack of urgency from Benghazi in the last few weeks.’ The renewed
statements of support from the contact group - and pledges of several hundred million more dollars for the opposition - came
as rebel forces fighting on both eastern and western fronts have found it difficult to solidify military advances.”).
227 Hague Says UK to Recognize Libyan Opposition, July 27, 2011 available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/us-
britain-libya-hague-idUSTRE76Q27720110727
228 Matthew Lee and Selcan Hacaoglu, Italy: Libyan Opposition Will Be Recognized, Forbes, July 15, 2011 available at http://
www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2011/07/15/general-libya-diplomacy_8566680.html.
229 Blockades as a measure to restore international peace and security are specifically allocated to the U.N. Security Council
under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art. 42.
230 Agilika Ganova, European Union Energy Supply Policy: United in Diversity?, Institut Européen des Hautes Etudes
Internationales 4 (2007), http://www.iehei.org/bibliotheque/memoires/MemoireGANOVA.pdf (“Energy is crucial for the
economic development, social stability and geopolitical security of every country. It has become even more important with the
growing competition for the access to the limited energy resources as dynamic economic growth and population increase are
bringing about a rise in energy demand. Energy policy is regarded as a strategic policy area as first, it has influence on national
economies; whether energy will be available at reasonable prices influence's a state's economic competitiveness and power ....
Energy security, in terms of secure supply and stable prices is increasingly related to geopolitics and international relations.”).
231 BP, Quantifying Energy: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 6 (2006), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/
bp_internet/russia/bp_russia_ english/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/s/Stat_Rev_2006_eng.pdf (noting that at the
end of 2005, the Middle East controlled 61.9 percent of the world's proven oil reserves; on top of that, 9.5 percent was in
Africa with Libya controlling the greatest share of the reserves).
232 See Libya Analysis Brief, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http:// www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/Libya/pdf.pdf (last updated Feb. 2011)
(“According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) the vast majority (around 85 percent) of Libyan oil exports are sold
to European countries namely Italy, Germany, France, and Spain. With the lifting of sanctions against Libya in 2004, the
United States has increased its imports of Libyan oil. According to EIA January through November estimates, the United
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